The Impact of Performance Ratings on Federal Personnel Decisions by Oh, Seong Soo
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Public Management and Policy Dissertations Department of Public Management and Policy
Fall 1-8-2010
The Impact of Performance Ratings on Federal
Personnel Decisions
Seong Soo Oh
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Public Management and Policy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Management and Policy Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Oh, Seong Soo, "The Impact of Performance Ratings on Federal Personnel Decisions." Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2010.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss/41
THE IMPACT OF PERFORMANCE RATINGS ON 
FEDERAL PERSONNEL DECISIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
The Academic Faculty 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Seong Soo Oh 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgia State University and Georgia Institute of Technology 
December 2009 
 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Seong Soo Oh 
  
THE IMPACT OF PERFORMANCE RATINGS ON  
FEDERAL PERSONNEL DECISIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by:   
   
Dr. Gregory B. Lewis, Advisor 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
 Dr. Gordon Kingsley 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. William L. Waugh Jr. 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
 Dr. Julia E. Melkers 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. Katherine G. Willoughby 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
  
   
  Date Approved:  August 31, 2009  
 iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES v 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS vii 
SUMMARY viii 
CHAPTER 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Background of the Study 1 
1.2 Performance Appraisals and Performance-Based Rewards 4 
1.3 History of Federal Performance Appraisals 6 
2 THE IMPACT OF RATINGS ON CAREER ADVANCEMENT 9 
2.1 Introduction 9 
2.2 Literature Review 11 
2.3 Other Factors Affecting Career Advancement 15 
2.4 Hypotheses 21 
2.5 Data and Methods 28 
2.6 Findings 34 
2.7 Conclusions 50 
3 PERFORMANCE RATINGS AND GENDER AND RACIAL                  
INEQUALITIES IN CAREER SUCCESS 53 
3.1 Introduction 53 
3.2 Literature Review 54 
3.3 Hypotheses 58 
3.4 Other Factors Affecting Performance Ratings, Salary Increases, and 
Promotions 62 
 iv 
3.5 Data and Methods 67 
3.6 Findings 75 
3.7 Conclusions 91 
4 CONCLUSION 94 
APPENDIX: TABLES 98 
REFERENCES 132 
 v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Performance Ratings and Career Advancement 35 
Table 2.2: Career Advancement Comparison: T-test 35 
Table 2.3: Impact of Performance Ratings on Career Advancement: Panel Model 37 
Table 3.1: Differences in Mean Characteristics by Race and gender 76 
Table 3.2: Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings by Year: 
Ordered Logit Model 80 
Table 3.3: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary 
Growth: Pooled OLS Model 86 
Table 3.4: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion: Pooled Logit 
Model 89 
Table A.1: Performance Appraisal Rating Distribution, 1988-2003 98 
Table A.2: Career Advancement by Year 99 
Table A.3: T-test by Year: Career Advancement Comparison between Fully Successful   
and Outstanding 100 
Table A.4: Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth                
by Year 101 
Table A.5: Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion Probability by Year 105 
Table A.6: Career Advancement by PATCO Category 106 
Table A.7: T-test by PACTO Category: Career Advancement Comparison                  
between Fully Successful and Outstanding 107 
Table A.8: Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth by 
PATCO Category: Panel Model 108 
Table A.9: Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion Probability                                 
by PATCO Category: Panel Model 109 
Table A.10: Career Advancement by Grade Level 110 
Table A.11: T-test by Grade Level: Career Advancement Comparison between Fully 
Successful and Outstanding 111 
 vi 
Table A.12: Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth              
by Grade: Panel Model 112 
Table A.13: Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion Probability by Grade: Panel 
Model 113 
Table A.14: Career Advancement by Agency 114 
Table A.15: T-test by Agency: Career Advancement Comparison between Fully 
Successful and Outstanding 115 
Table A.16: Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth by 
Agency: Panel Model 116 
Table A.17: Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion Probability by Agency: Panel 
Model 118 
Table A.18: Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings by Sex-type 
of Occupation: Ordered Logit Model 120 
Table A.19 Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings by PATCO 
Category: Ordered Logit Model 121 
Table A.20 Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings by Grade 
Level: Ordered Logit Model 124 
Table A.21 Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings by Agency: 
Ordered Logit Model 126 
Table A.22: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in 
Salary Growth in the Upper and Lower Grade Levels 128 
Table A.23: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in 
Salary Growth in the Male-Dominant and Female-Dominant Occupations 129 
Table A.24: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion in the Upper 
and Lower Grade Levels 130 
Table A.25: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion in the   Male-
Dominant and Female-Dominant Occupations 131 
 vii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
CPDF Central Personnel Data File 
CSRA Civil Service Reform Act  
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GS General Schedule 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
OLS Ordinary Least Square 
OPM Office of Personnel Management 
PATCO Professional, Administrative, Technical, Clerical, and Other 
PMRS Performance Management and Recognition System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
SUMMARY 
 
Can pay-for-performance increase the motivation of public employees?  By 
providing a basis for personnel decisions, particularly linking rewards to performance, 
performance appraisals aim to increase employees’ work motivation and ultimately to 
improve their work performance and organizational productivity.  With the emphasis on 
results-oriented management, performance appraisals have become a key managerial tool 
in the public sector.  Critics charge, however, that pay-for-performance is ineffective in 
the public sector, largely because the link between performance and rewards is weak.  
However, no one has empirically measured the strength of the linkage.   
If performance ratings do have an impact on career success in the federal service, 
they might contribute to race and gender inequality.  Although many studies have 
examined factors affecting gender and racial differences in career success, studies that try 
to connect gender and racial inequalities to managerial tools are scarce.   
Using a one percent sample of federal personnel records, the first essay examines 
the impact of performance ratings on salary increases and promotion probabilities, and 
the second essay explores whether women and minorities receive lower ratings than 
comparable white males, and women and minorities receive lower returns on the same 
level of performance ratings than comparable white males.  The first essay finds that 
performance ratings have only limited impact on salary increases, but that they 
significantly affect promotion probability.  Thus, the argument that performance-rewards 
link is weak could be partially correct, if it considers only pay-performance relationships.  
The second essay finds that women receive equal or higher performance ratings than 
 ix 
comparable white men, but some minority male groups, particularly black men, tend to 
receive lower ratings than comparable white men.  On the other hand, the returns on 
outstanding ratings do not differ between women and minority male groups and white 
men, though women groups seem to have disadvantages in promotion with the same 
higher ratings as comparable men in highly male-dominant occupations.   
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 Background of the Study 
 Many observers believe that the link between performance and rewards is weak in 
the federal service.  Paul Light criticizes the lack of compensation for outstanding 
performers in the federal service, arguing that “the very definition of outstanding 
demands comparison.  If the term is to have merit, it cannot apply to more than a 
handful” (Light, 1999).  Rynes et al. (2005) also argue that “Given the typically weak link 
between performance and pay as well as problems with getting supervisors to provide 
credible measures of performance for administrative purposes, perhaps any positive 
results at all should be regarded as impressive” (p. 588, my italics).  That weak link 
between performance and rewards may be a primary reason why critics argue 
performance-based compensation is not effective and has failed to achieve desired 
outcomes (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough & Nigro, 2002; Pearce & Perry, 1983). 
 Critics, however, do not provide empirical evidence on how weak the link 
between performance and rewards is.  Performance appraisal systems stand on the belief 
that by providing a basis for personnel decisions, particularly linking pay to performance, 
performance appraisals motivate employees to increase their work efforts, and hence 
improve individual performance and organizational productivity (Daley, 1992; Milkovich 
& Wigdor, 1991).  Therefore, for performance-based rewards to be effective, they must 
link rewards to employee performance, but many studies have found that the link 
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between performance and rewards is weak (Pearce & Perry, 1983; Rynes et al., 2005; 
Smith & Rupp, 2003).   
 However, the arguments that performance-rewards link is weak are mostly based 
on surveys or less systematic perceptions.  Ingraham (1993), for example, cited two 
surveys conducted by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board and argued, “[A] majority 
of those responding do not perceive a link between performance and reward” (p. 352, 
italics in original).  In response to the 1989 Merit Principles Survey question “If you 
perform better in your present job, how likely is it that you will receive more pay?”, for 
instance, only 37.1 percent said it was “likely” or “very likely.”  This survey gives us 
employee perceptions on the practice of pay-for-performance in the federal civil service, 
but it still does not provide quantifiable evidence on the strength of the link between 
performance and pay.  If there is a meaningful difference in performance pay between top 
and average performers but only a few employees are evaluated as top performers, for 
instance, then most average performers cannot improve their performance enough to 
receive that performance pay and their answers would primary be “unlikely.”  On the 
contrary, if most employees receive performance pay, though the amount is small, the 
employees would choose “very likely.”  Does this mean that performance-pay 
relationship is very strong, so that performance-based pay is very effective to motivate 
employess?  Other problems with this kind of survey are that employees may not 
recognize the size of difference in performance rewards between high and average 
performers or, because most federal employees dislike performance appraisal and pay-
for-performance (Ingraham, 1993), they may recognize pay differences between high and 
average performers but not want to admit it.  Despite the significance of the topic, little is 
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known about the strength of the linkage between performance and rewards.  The 
dissertation provides empirical evidence by examining the impact of performance ratings 
on salary growth and promotion probabilities. 
 If agencies use performance appraisals to make pay and promotion decisions, 
performance ratings should be associated with an individual’s career success.  According 
to Sherk (2007), pay inequality among individuals rose in recent years due to increased 
use of performance pay.  Also, performance appraisals could be associated with gender 
and racial disparities in career success.  Castilla (2008) presents two possible 
explanations of how performance ratings can contribute to the disadvantages of women 
and minorities in career success.  First, women and minorities can receive lower 
performance ratings than comparable men and whites with the same performance level 
(“performance-evaluation bias”).  Second, women and minorities can receive lower 
returns on the same performance ratings (“performance-reward bias”).  Although, many 
studies have examined factors affecting gender and racial differences in career success, 
few try to connect gender and racial inequalities to managerial tools.  The dissertation 
explores how performance appraisals could be associated with gender and racial 
disparities in career success.   
 The dissertation is composed of two essays.  Using a one percent sample of the 
Central Personnel Data File, which is maintained by the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, essay 1 examines how strongly performance ratings affect salary growth 
and promotion in the federal civil service, and essay 2 explores how performance ratings 
are associated with gender and racial inequalities in federal career success. 
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1.2 Performance Appraisals and Performance-Based Rewards 
 Although many researchers have studied performance appraisal, the practice of 
performance evaluation varies among organizations and the term “performance 
appraisal” is used a bit differently from researcher to researcher.  Some researchers define 
performance appraisal broadly and use performance appraisal and performance 
management interchangeably.  But in general, performance appraisal refers to “the 
process in which, for a specified period of time, employees’ work performance, 
behaviors, or traits are rated, judged, or described by a person other than the rated 
employee and the results are kept by the organization” (Coens & Jenkins, 2000, p. 14). 
 Typically, employees’ performance is evaluated by their immediate supervisors 
(Daley, 1992).  Immediate supervisors know their subordinates best and can use 
performance appraisal as a managerial tool.  However, many kinds of rater errors can 
occur, and that reduces the credibility of the evaluation results.  Examples of these types 
of errors include the halo effect (inappropriate generalization of one aspect of an 
employee’ performance to all other aspects of the job), first impression error (influence of 
initial positive or negative impression on an employee to subsequent evaluation on the 
employee), the similar-to-me effect (giving higher ratings to those who resembled raters), 
the comparison or contrast effect (evaluating based on the relative performance of each 
other not on the actual performance), and central tendency error (evaluating all 
employees in the middle of the scale) (Kellough, 2002; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995).  To 
reduce rater error, many studies have concentrated on how to improve performance 
appraisal or have suggested alternatives (Bretz et al., 1992).  Frequently suggested 
prescriptions include 360 degree evaluations, which combine information from 
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supervisors, peers, subordinates, and self-evaluation to evaluate employee performance 
(Rynes et al., 2005), and rater training to improve accuracy (Daley, 1992).   
 Ideally, raters should evaluate job outcomes, but because performance 
measurement is so difficult, particularly in the public sector (Montoya & Graham, 2007), 
most organizations evaluate employees based on their traits, such as dependability and 
cooperativeness, and on some behaviors (Kellough, 2002).   
 The results of performance appraisal are used for numerous purposes.  The 
common purposes of performance appraisals can be grouped into two broad categories: 
developmental and judgmental (Boswell & Boudreau, 2000; Daley, 1992, 2005; Rynes et 
al., 2005).  Developmental purposes focus on distinguishing within individuals whereas 
judgmental purposes are related to distinguishing among individuals (Cleveland et al., 
1989).  According to Boswell & Boudreau (2002), development is “any effort concerned 
with enriching attitudes, experiences, and skills which improve the effectiveness of 
employees” (p. 392).  Examples of developmental uses are identifying strengths and 
weaknesses and identifying training needs.  Thus, developmental purposes focus more on 
individuals’ potential than on current levels of skills and abilities.   
 Judgmental purposes are well known for merit pay or pay-for-performance.  
Performance appraisals compare individuals’ performance to other employees or to set 
standards in the organization, and therefore help to identify good and bad performers.  
Based on the performance appraisal results, organizations make administrative decisions.  
According to Daley (1992), “promotion and merit pay are the two most widely known 
and used of the judgmental appraisal purposes” (p. 17).  Other judgmental purposes 
include decisions on retention, demotion, and reassignment.    
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 In theory, performance appraisals are supposed to be used for both developmental 
and judgmental purposes.  In practice, judgmental appraisals that affect pay and 
promotion decisions are common than developmental appraisals (Daley, 1992; Murphy & 
Cleveland, 1995).  
 
1.3 History of Federal Performance Appraisals 
  The history of performance appraisal in the federal government begins in the early 
1950s with the passage of the Performance Rating Act of 1950, which aimed to identify 
the best and worst employees (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2008b, 2008c).  
However, both supervisors and subordinates were dissatisfied with performance appraisal 
and it was not emphasized in the federal government throughout the 1960s and most of 
the 1970s (Riccucci & Naff, 2008).  The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978 
changed the performance appraisal system dramatically.  Agencies were required to 
develop appraisal systems for all federal employees and were told that “results of the 
appraisal must be used as a basis for training, rewarding, reassigning, promoting, 
reducing in grade, retaining, and removing employees” (U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, 2008c).  The CSRA also created the Merit Pay System which covers 
supervisors and managers in General Schedule (GS) 13-15.  Under the Merit Pay System, 
which became mandatory on October 1, 1981, agencies pooled half of the general 
comparability adjustment and within-grade and quality-step increase monies and 
distributed the fund to the employees based on their performance ratings (Milkovich & 
Wigdor, 1991; Nigro et al., 2007).  However, the Merit Pay System did not work well; 
funding for merit pay was cut and employees complained about “meaningless merit 
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increases” (Nigro et al., 2007).  Pearce and Perry (1983) found that the Merit Pay System 
was not better than the previous seniority-based compensation in motivating employees. 
 The federal government introduced the Performance Management and 
Recognition System (PMRS) in 1985 and replaced the Merit Pay System with a new pay-
for-performance system for GS 13-15 employees.  Under this system, middle managers 
were assigned one of five summary ratings and received performance awards based on 
those ratings.  PMRS covered about 8 percent of federal white-collar employees in 1993 
(Eisenberg & Ingraham, 1993).   
 In 1995, the federal government substantially decentralized performance appraisal 
and pay-for-performance.  Agencies can now select eight permissible summary rating 
patterns, allowing from two (pass or fail) to five levels of summary ratings (U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management, 2008c).  The two largest federal departments (Homeland 
Security and Defense) were allowed to develop their own compensation systems, using 
pay banding to widen the gap between the pay of high and low performers (Hyde, 2005; 
Naff & Newman, 2004).   
 Federal experience with performance-based pay is not positive, however.  Studies 
found that federal supervisors did not differentiate enough between high and poor 
performers in performance ratings, which made it hard for high performers to receive 
enough rewards; they also found that the systems failed to motivate employees (Gaertner 
& Gaertner, 1985; Nigro et al., 2007; Pearce & Perry, 1983).  Nevertheless, performance-
based pay is always a popular reform.  The Obama Administration is going to introduce a 
governmentwide pay-for-performance system that “takes employees’ performance into 
account when compensating them” (Losey, 2009). The Office of Personnel Management 
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(OPM) director announced the reform plan for making effective pay-for-performance, 
which allows large pay increases for a small number of truly outstanding performers.  On 
the other hand, Kunreuther (2009) argues that the precondition for effective pay-for-
performance is an unbiased and realistic evaluation system but that decades of federal 
experience show the precondition is hard to achieve.  He also argues that rewarding only 
a few stellar performers with substantial pay-out may demotivate a large number of 
mediocre employees, so that the system cannot achieve improved organizational 
productivity.  However, little is known about whether the federal government has ever 
rewarded outstanding performance with “substantial pay-outs,” whether the amount of 
merit pay was enough to motivate outstanding performers, and whether rewarding 
outstanding performers with “substantial pay out” demotivates average performers.  
Indeed, there exists a widespread perception that the link between pay and performance is 
weak, and therefore reform efforts have focused on strengthening it.  However, in order 
to achieve the goal of improving organizational productivity, a reform initiative needs not 
just perception but empirical data on the relationship between pay and performance.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE IMPACT OF RATINGS ON CAREER ADVANCEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 With the emphasis on results-oriented public management, performance appraisal 
systems have become a key tool for managing public agencies’ performance.  By 
providing a basis for personnel decisions, particularly by linking rewards to performance, 
performance appraisals seek to motivate poor performers to increase their productivity, 
and strong performers to maintain or enhance theirs.  Because of the theoretical promise 
of improving individual performance and ultimately organizational productivity, 
organizations have made much effort to improve performance-based compensation as 
well as to develop performance appraisal systems (Bretz et al., 1992).   
 One of the major issues of the federal reform effort was the extent to which 
performance appraisal results would be used for personnel decisions.  The Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978 states that federal agencies should develop performance appraisals 
for all employees and use the results “as a basis for training, rewarding, reassigning, 
promoting, reducing in grade, retaining, and removing employees” (U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, 2008c).  However, critics argue that performance appraisals in 
the public sector are broken, particularly because the linkage between performance and 
rewards is so weak that performance appraisals fail to serve their purpose of motivating 
employees and improving performance (Light, 1999).   
 Because of the central role of performance-based rewards in federal human 
resource management, the Obama Administration is pursuing reform by establishing a 
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governmentwide pay-for-performance system that “should include large raises for a small 
group of truly outstanding performers” (Rosenberg, 2009).  How large do performance 
pay differences between the best and worst performers need to be to motivate them?  
Although reform efforts to make effective performance appraisal systems should start 
from a knowledge of the relationship between performance appraisal results and rewards, 
little is known about the strength of the linkage.  In addition, results of performance 
appraisals are supposed to be used for numerous purposes including promotion decisions, 
but most studies have focused primarily on merit pay or pay-for-performance. 
 This study examines the impact of performance ratings on salary increases and 
promotions in the federal civil service.  For performance-based compensation to be 
effective, according to equity theory, there should be meaningful reward differences 
among employees depending on their performance.  This study does not judge whether 
reward differences are “meaningful” but measures the differences in rewards by 
performance rating levels and provides a basis for judging whether the differences are 
large enough to motivate employees.  Expectancy theory argues that employees are 
motivated when they perceive that their work effort leads to higher performance 
(expectancy), that higher performance leads to rewards (instrumentality), and that the 
rewards are valuable to them (valence).  This study does not cover the expectancy and 
valence parts of expectancy theory.  In other words, the present study does not examine 
whether performance ratings reflect employees’ real performance or whether 
governments’ rewards are valuable to public employees.  This study focuses only on one 
part of instrumentality: whether higher performance ratings lead to higher rewards.  In 
particular, because pay and promotion are primary rewards for government employees, 
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this study examines how strongly performance ratings are tied to pay increases and 
promotions. 
 This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 reviews theories that provide a 
basis for performance-based rewards and previous studies that are related to 
performance-rewards relationship.  Section 2.3 reviews factors that affect career 
advancement.  Section 2.4 develops hypotheses on pay increase and promotion 
probabilities.  Section 2.5 describes the data, variables, and research design.  Section 2.6 
presents the findings and discusses what they tell us about the hypotheses.  Section 2.7 
concludes the paper by summarizing the study and discussing its implications. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Theoretical Bases of Performance-Based Rewards 
 According to equity theory, employees’ work motivation depends on a balance 
between their perceived inputs to organizations and outcomes from the organizations to 
them (Adams, 1965).  Employees consider both internal and external equity.  Internal 
equity means that employees feel inequity if their input is greater or smaller than the 
rewards.  External equity means that employees compare their outcome/input ratio with 
those of their coworkers, and they feel inequity if their outcome/input ratio is lower or 
higher than their coworkers’.  Equity theory argues that employees try to reach a balance 
either by reducing their input (work effort) if they are under-compensated or by raising 
their input if they are over-compensated, either in terms of internal or external equity.    
Many empirical studies support the theory, finding that undercompensated workers lower 
their input to achieve equity (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Griffeth et al., 1989; Heneman & 
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Werner, 2005).  Although critics argue that employees’ responses on overcompensation 
differ from those on undercompensation (Mowday, 1991) and that perceptions of fairness  
are influenced not only by “the ends achieved” (distributive justice) but by “the means 
used to achieve those ends” (procedural justice) (Greenberg, 1990), equity theory 
provides a useful framework for understanding worker behavior in organizations (Bolino 
& Turnley, 2008).   
 In particular, equity theory gives us some implications for performance-based 
rewards (Heneman & Werner, 2005).  For performance-based rewards to be effective, 
employees must perceive the amount of rewards to be equitable both compared to their 
input and compared to other employees (Gabris & Ihrke, 2000).  Therefore, in order to 
retain high performers and keep their performance level high, there should be meaningful 
reward differences between high and average performers.  Because employees’ perceived 
input/outcome ratio is as important as the actual input/outcome ratio but equity sensitivity 
varies among employees (Rainey, 2003), managers need to better communicate with 
employees on performance rewards. 
 Another theory that provides a rationale for performance-contingent rewards is 
expectancy theory.  Vroom (1964) argues that an employee’s work effort is a function of 
the multiplication of expectancy, instrumentality, and valence.  The theory indicates that 
in order for rewards to motivate employees, individuals should perceive that more effort 
leads to higher performance (expectancy), that improved performance leads to higher 
rewards (instrumentality), and that the rewards are valuable to them (valence).  Many 
researchers propose that expectancy theory is a useful framework to understand 
individual and organizational motivations and apply the theory to a variety of settings, 
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including faculty motivation to conduct research (Chen et al., 2006; Tien, 2000), student 
motivation to learn (Hancock, 1995), and organizations’ strategic decisions (Chen & 
Miller, 1994).  
 Expectancy theory has some implications for performance-based rewards 
(Heneman & Werner, 2005).  First, there should be an opportunity for employees to 
improve their performance.  If not, expectancy cannot be present.  Second, the amount of 
reward should be contingent upon the level of performance, so that employees can 
understand that performance is instrumental in achieving performance-based rewards.  
Third, rewards must be a valued outcome to the employees. 
 Several issues occur when the theory is applied to performance-based rewards.  In 
many cases, employees work together with their coworkers so that individual effort may 
not result in increased performance.  Because of resource limitations, organizations often 
can not provide high enough rewards for high performance.  One of the controversial 
issues is how effective the extrinsic rewards are.  Organizations largely rely on monetary 
rewards to motivate employees.  It is clear that monetary rewards are strong motivators 
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Lawler, 1971; Locke et al., 1980; Rynes et al., 2004; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 2003).  For example, Locke et al. (1980) argue that “money is the 
crucial incentive” and that “no other incentive or motivational technique comes even 
close to money with respect to its instrumental value” (p. 379).  However, public 
employees tend to place great value on the intrinsic rewards (Houston, 2000) and on 
helping others and serving society rather than monetary rewards (Perry, 1996).  Oh and 
Lewis (2009) found that performance appraisal systems, which rely on extrinsic rewards, 
are less effective with intrinsically motivated public employees.  In addition, in some 
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circumstances, extrinsic rewards can drive out intrinsic motivation, particularly when a 
majority of employees are intrinsically motivated (Canton, 2005; Frey, 1997; James, 
2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000).   
 
Linkage between Performance Appraisal Results and Rewards 
 Agencies introduce performance appraisal as a tool to motivate employees.  Some 
studies show that merit pay results in positive outcomes, particularly for individual 
performance (Heneman & Werner, 2005; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991).  In theory, 
performance-based rewards are promising and some positive experience in the private 
sector provides good justification of performance-based rewards in the public sector.  In 
practice, however, many empirical studies show that performance appraisal is ineffective 
and that the impact of performance ratings on salary decision is minimal in the public 
sector (Pearce & Perry, 1983; Smith & Rupp, 2003).   
 The ineffectiveness of performance appraisal and performance-based pay comes 
from a variety of sources.  In order for performance appraisal results to be used for pay 
decisions, performance ratings should reflect employee performance accurately so that 
everyone can trust the results.  However, rater error is unavoidable, particularly in the 
public sector where performance is not easily measured.  Not only because of 
measurement itself, but because of supervisors’ rational behavior, performance ratings do 
not reflect real employee performance (Klingner & Nalbandian, 1998; Murphy, 2008; 
Nigro et al., 2007; Rynes et al., 2005).  For example, Murphy (Murphy, 2008) argues that 
“performance appraisal is a complex event that occurs in environments that often push 
raters to distort their ratings to accomplish valued goals or to avoid the negative 
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repercussions of giving ratings their subordinates or superiors will find objectionable” (p. 
198).  Nigro et al. (2007) also argue that accurate ratings are not rewarded by the 
organization, and “negative ratings often yield nothing more than stressful interpersonal 
conflict and time-consuming appeals by resentful workers to suspicious civil service 
boards” (p. 170).  Under these circumstances, it is hard for organizations to rely much on 
the performance ratings when they make pay decisions.  
 Another reason for the weak relationship between performance ratings and 
rewards is a shortage of resources.  Pay and promotion are limited. In particular, it is hard 
for government agencies to have large enough budgets to give meaningful pay 
differences between good and poor performers.  Rating errors and limited resources result 
in inflated performance ratings (Riccucci & Naff, 2008).  According to the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, over two thirds of all federal employees received performance 
ratings of 4 or 5, the two top ratings, during the fiscal years of 1991-1996 (U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, 1999).     
  Whether performance ratings reflect employee performance accurately or not, 
performance ratings are used as proxy of employee productivity in many studies (Alonso 
& Lewis, 2000; Medoff & Abraham, 1981).  Whether performance ratings are inflated or 
not, individual performance ratings are supposed to be linked to organizational rewards 
under pay-for-performance systems (Heneman & Werner, 2005).  This study aims to 
determine whether and how strongly performance ratings are related to rewards.  
 
2.3 Other Factors Affecting Career Advancement 
 Studies have shown that individual characteristics and job-related factors are 
associated with career advancement.  To correctly measure the impact of performance 
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ratings on salary increases and promotion probabilities, this study controls for gender, 
race, education, federal experience, age, supervisory status, grade, occupation type, and 
agencies.  This section briefly reviews how these factors are associated with pay and 
promotion.  
 
Gender and Racial Minority Status 
 Gender and race are important factors in predicting career success.  Many studies 
show that women’s and minorities’ average salaries are lower than men’s and whites’, 
though the gender pay gap has been decreasing.  Glass ceiling theory argues women and 
minorities have fewer opportunities for advancement to upper-level positions than do 
men and whites, but studies on gender/racial differences in promotion probabilities 
provide mixed results.  While some studies have found that promotion probabilities are 
lower for women and minorities than for white men (Blau & DeVaro, 2006; Cobb-Clark, 
2001; Paulin & Mellor, 1996), others find that women’s promotion probabilities are as 
high or higher than men’s (Hersch & Viscusi, 1996; Krull, 2006; Lewis, 1986, 1992).  
Hersch and Viscusi (1996) explain that because women tend to be hired at lower level 
women have higher promotion rates than men.  Gerhart and Milkovich (1989) also found 
women received more promotions and larger salary increases than men, and explained 
that one reason is that women work at lower positions which have large promotion 
opportunities. 
 
Education 
 Education is a key element of human capital.  According to human capital theory, 
education increases individual productivity, so more educated employees earn more than 
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less educated employees (Becker 1993; Mincer 1993).  Screening theory, on the other 
hand, argues that education does not enhance productivity but that higher earnings reflect 
innate ability, which leads individuals to obtain more education, and employers use 
educational attainment as a proxy for likely productivity (Belman & Heywood, 1991; 
Hungerford & Solon, 1987; Spence, 1974).  Empirical studies show that education has no 
impact on salary increase (Lewis, 1997a) and has only minimal effect on promotion 
probabilities in the federal government (Lewis, 1986).  
 
Federal Experience 
 Work experience is a human capital factor that increases salary level.  However, 
studies show that work experience is curvilinearly associated with salary increases (e.g., 
Lewis & Oh, 2009), probably because workers invest in skills more early in their careers 
than late in their careers (Becker, 1973).  Empirical studies have found that salary 
increases and promotion probabilities drop with federal experiences (Lewis, 1986, 1997a). 
 
Age 
 Most labor economics literature that has examined the determinants of salary 
show that age has positive impact on salary.  However, a positive coefficient on age does 
not necessarily (?) mean that older employees are more productive than younger 
employees (Hellerstein et al., 1999).  Studies have found that the relationship between 
age and productivity is negative (Rhodes, 1983; Cox & Nkomo, 1992) or that age is not 
related to productivity (McEvoy & Cascio, 1989).  On the other hand, Sturman (2003) 
showed that age-productivity relationship is not linear but inverted U-shape, indicating 
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age is positively associated with productivity up to a certain age, and then negatively 
associated with productivity.  Consistent with Sturman (2003), Lewis and Oh (2008) 
showed that the relationship between age and salary level is curvilinear, which means 
salary rises at a decreasing rate and then decreases at a increasing rate with age.  Lewis 
(1997a) also found that salary increase and promotion chances drop with age in the 
federal agencies.   
 
Supervisory Status 
 Federal supervisors earn more than nonsupervisors.  Taylor (1979) analyzed 
15,912 federal employees drawn from the U.S. Civil Service Commission’s data file and 
showed supervisors’ salaries were 11.5 to 17.2 percent higher than nonsupervisors in 
1977, after controlling for age, years of service, veterans status, years of education, and 
PATCO category.  Using data from the Central Personnel Data File, Johnson and Libecap 
(1989) found supervisors earned 14.2 percent more than nonsupervisors in 1985, holding 
constant level of education, occupational group, and PATCO category.  Asch (2001) 
analyzed data from the Department of Defense civil service personnel and found 
supervisors earned 6.0 to 11.4 percentage points more than nonsupervisors, controlling 
for a variety of variables including performance rating.   
 Although supervisors have a salary advantage, they do not differ in promotion 
probabilities from comparable federal employees who are not supervisors.  Asch (2001) 
showed that supervisors’ promotion speed is not faster than nonsupervisors in the 
Department of Defense and the three military departments when she controlled for 
individual and job-related factors.   
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Grade Level 
 In the federal civil service, salary level is largely a function of grade level.  Job 
evaluation determines the value of the job and assigns the grade for the job (U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management, 2002b).  Advancement to a higher grade leads to about a 10 
percent increase in salary (Spyropoulos, 2005).  Promotion chances drops with grade.  In 
his study on middle-level federal managers, Lewis (1992) showed men’s average 
promotion rates were 7.6 percent for GS 13, 6.1 percent for GS 14, and 2.4 percent for 
GS 15 in 1979-1989.  Naff (1994) showed the average promotion rate was about 10 
percent or below for GS 13-GS 15 whereas the rate was 33 to 44 percent for GS 9 in 
1991-1992.  Lewis (1997a) compared promotion probability among grade level groups in 
the federal agencies and found promotion probabilities were highest at GS 1-GS 3 and 
decreased with the grade, holding gender, age, federal experience, and education constant. 
 
PATCO Category 
 All federal white-collar occupations are classified into five categories: 
Professional, Administrative, Technical, Clerical, and Other (PATCO), based on “the 
subject matter of work, the level of difficulty or responsibility involved, and the 
educational requirements” (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2002a, p. 242).  
Because the PATCO system requires a higher level of education (a bachelor’s degree) for 
positions in Professional and Administrative than for positions in the three other 
categories (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2002a), employees in Professional and 
Administrative categories have a career advantage over employees in the other three 
categories.  In general, Professional and Administrative occupations are “two-grade 
interval” series, because promotions are granted two grades at a time from General 
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Schedule 5 through 11, while Technical and Clerical occupations are “one-grade interval” 
series, which means employees are promoted one grade at a time (U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, 2002b).  Because promotion to a higher grade results in higher 
salary increases than normal annual salary increases, employees in Professional and 
Administrative also have a salary advantage.  Studies show that women’s disadvantages 
in pay in federal agencies are associated with their relatively high concentration on 
Technical or Clerical occupations (e.g., DiPrete & Soule, 1986; Lewis, 1996).   
 
Agency 
 Career patterns of employees vary with the agencies in which they work.  Borjas 
(1980) found that employee salary rate was negatively related to the size of the agency in 
the federal government and that in 1977 salaries for comparable employees were highest 
in Community Service Administration and lowest in Agriculture.   Lewis (1997a) showed 
that Defense employees’ salary increases and promotion chances were lower than 
comparable employees in domestic agencies. 
 As discussed above, federal career advancement is not simply a function of some 
individual characteristics, but numerous factors come into play to in determining pay 
increases and promotion probabilities.  In addition, those factors could be positively or 
negatively associated with performance ratings that employees receive.  For example, 
Lewis (1997b) shows that older employees are more likely than younger ones to receive 
outstanding ratings in federal agencies.  Therefore, it is necessary to separate these 
factors for measuring the relationship between performance ratings and career 
advancement.  
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2.4 Hypotheses 
Pay Increase 
 Performance appraisal systems are designed to evaluate employee performance 
and agencies use the results for pay decisions.  Based on equity and expectancy theories, 
higher performers should receive higher merit increases and poor performers should 
receive low or no merit increases.  For performance-based pay to be effective, some 
portion of the pay increase should be based on employee performance and there should 
be meaningful differences in performance pay among employees.  Mitra et al. (1995) 
argue that if the merit portion of the annual salary increase is too small, merit pay could 
decrease employee motivation and morale; therefore, they argue, merit pay should be at 
least 6 to 7 percent of base pay if it is to be effective.  Fuller and Tinkham (2002) suggest 
that, in a firm with an effective reward differentiation program, outstanding performers 
(defined as the top 5 to 15 percent) receive performance pay twice that of average 
performers and poor performers receive 40 percent less than average performers.  Medoff 
and Abraham (1981) measured the impact of performance ratings on the log of annual 
salary in two major U.S. corporations and found that differences in salary between those 
who received the highest and lowest performance rating were 7.8 and 6.2 percent, after 
controlling for level of education, years of work experience, region, and grade level.   
 Under the Performance Management and Recognition System introduced in 1985, 
federal employees in GS 13-15 who received level 5 (outstanding) were to receive 
performance awards of 2 to 10 percent of their pay in addition to the general pay increase 
(a percentage increase to base pay and a locality pay adjustment which is recommended 
by Congress and approved by the President), whereas those who received level 2 and 1 
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were to be penalized: level 2 employees were to receive only 50 percent of the general 
pay increase and level 1 employees were to receive no pay increase (Riccucci & Naff, 
2008).    
Hypothesis 1.1: Salary increases will be higher for highly rated employees than 
for poorly rated employees. 
  
 In general, the amounts of performance pay do not seem to vary much among 
employees either in the private or public sector, however (Heneman & Werner, 2005; 
Murphy, 1992; Zenger, 1992).  According to Teel (1986), “most of the organizations 
surveyed awarded 60 percent or more of their employees raises that varied no more than 
2 percent from the average” (p. 90).  Employees in the Federal Senior Executive Service 
do not think pay and bonuses are meaningfully different among executives.  Only 26 
percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that “Pay distinctions are meaningfully 
different among executives” (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2008e, p. 2).  OPM 
(2008b) explains that the reason such a low percentage of federal executives believe pay 
differs meaningfully may be because the rating pattern used in the agencies does have 
enough rating levels to distinguish employee performance or agencies do not have 
enough funding to make difference between good and poor performers (U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, 2008b). 
Hypothesis 1.2: Differences in salary increases between highly rated and poorly 
rated employees will be small. 
  
 Many scholars and practitioners point out that one of the serious problems with 
performance appraisals is rating inflation (Eisenberg & Ingraham, 1993; Light, 1999; 
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Murphy & Cleveland, 1995): “Everybody gets a satisfactory rating or above” (Taylor et 
al., 1995, p. 506).  Ratings inflation jeopardizes the performance appraisal systems (Bretz 
et al., 1992; Hyde, 2005), they argue, because inflated ratings make it hard to measure 
employees’ work performance accurately, and thus it is difficult for organizations to use 
performance ratings for either administrative or developmental purposes (Roch, 2005).       
 Many studies have tried to uncover the source of rating inflation.  Murphy and 
Cleveland (1995) argue that, inflated ratings are mostly a result of raters’ rational 
behavior, not an inability to evaluate performance accurately.  Raters give inflated ratings 
because high evaluations may indicate that the raters are effective in employee 
development (Greenberg, 1991) and because “they want to be personally popular” 
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, p. 168).  Murphy and Cleveland (1995), focusing on negative 
consequences of accurate ratings, add more reasons why raters inflate their ratings.  
Because a low rating can result in an unpleasant situation, raters inflate to avoid that 
situation.  In the worst case, “accuracy in evaluation could make it difficult for 
supervisors and subordinates to work together” (p. 266), and therefore accurate rating 
could lower organizational productivity in the long run.  They argue that if accurate 
ratings are an important goal, organizations must reward accurate ratings and punish 
inaccuracy; otherwise rational supervisors are likely to give inflated ratings to their 
subordinates.   
 However, little is known about how rating inflation affects rating effectiveness.  
There are two opposing arguments.  Some researchers argue that ratings used for 
personnel decisions are significantly higher than ratings used for feedback or research 
(Jawahar & Williams, 1997; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995).  
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On the contrary, Montoya and Graham (2007) argue that it is easy for supervisors to give 
higher ratings when the highest rating does not necessarily lead to additional pay.   
 Although both explanations are possible depending on the organizational context 
(Daley, 1992), performance ratings should be less inflated if organizations use 
performance ratings to make personnel decisions, because they have limited resources to 
reward high performers.  The experience of the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) was that performance ratings are not inflated but differentiate among employees 
when personnel decisions rely heavily on performance evaluations.  In January 2002, 
GAO implemented a new competency-based performance management system, which 
emphasizes links between performance and merit pay increases.  As a result, “for fiscal 
year 2002, the GAO-wide average performance appraisal rating was 2.19 (out of 5) 
compared with 4.26 (out of 5) for fiscal year 2001.  Similarly, under the new system, no 
employees received a score of 4.7 or higher, while 19 percent of employees received a 
score of 4.7 or higher for fiscal year 2001” (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003, pp. 9-
10).  If performance ratings are not inflated, it may imply that performance ratings have a 
substantial impact on personnel decisions. 
 Examples of private companies that employ forced ranking systems, in which 
raters must rate employees according to the assigned number of employees for each grade, 
also support that performance rating-personnel decision relationship is stronger when 
performance rating is less inflated.  In the private sector, the use of forced ranking system 
has become popular in recent years.  For example, the General Electric system limits the 
highest performers to 20 percent and classifies 10 percent of employees as the poorest 
performers.  Studies show that companies employing the forced ranking system aim not 
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only to avoid rating inflation but to strongly tie personnel decisions to performance 
(Kräkel, 2008; Scullen et al., 2005).  
 Average performance ratings vary widely among federal agencies.  Employees in 
the Army were six times as likely as employees in Agriculture to receive outstanding 
ratings in 1995 (67 vs. 11 percent), and employees in Defense Department received high 
ratings whereas employees in Agriculture, Labor, Treasury, Interior, Transportation, and 
Veterans Affairs received low ratings (Lewis, 1997b).  Also, the average performance 
rating rose between 1991 and 1996 and the rise over time is pretty steady  (U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, 1999).  The average rating for General Schedule 13-15 
supervisors and management officials, increased from 4.16 (in 1991) to 4.45 (in 1996), 
and the percentage receiving outstanding ratings increased from 34.7 to 56.0 percent.  In 
General Schedule 1-12, the average rating rose from 3.95 to 4.16, and the percentage 
receiving outstanding ratings was 27.2 percent in 1991 but 39.2 percent in 1996 (U.S. 
Office of Personnel Management, 1999).   
Hypothesis 1.3: As performance ratings have risen over time, the impact of 
performance ratings on salary increase has decreased. 
Hypothesis 1.4: The impact of performance ratings on salary increase was 
smaller in agencies where mean performance ratings were higher. 
 
Promotion Probabilities 
Informing promotion decisions is another important purpose of performance 
appraisals (Milkovich & Newman, 1996; Murphy & Cleveland, 1995).  Buckley et al. 
(1995) write that “Performance appraisals are tied to many individual and organizational 
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outcomes, that is, pay and promotion” (p. 105).  Some federal agencies also clearly state 
that performance appraisals serve as a basis for promotion decisions (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2009; U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2008d).  For 
example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2009) states that the 
objectives of its performance management are “To use performance appraisal results as a 
basis for paying, rewarding, [and] promoting” (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2009).  
Compared to pay decisions, promotion decisions have several different 
characteristics, however.  First, while performance-based pay is contingent on past 
performance, promotion decisions not only serve as a reward for past performance but 
consider who are the best fit for the advanced job (Banks & Murphy, 1985).  Second, 
organizations make performance-based pay decisions annually, but make promotion 
decisions based on the past several years’ work (London & Stumpf, 1983).  Third, unlike 
pay decisions, employees in higher grade levels have fewer chances to be promoted, 
because position openings are fewer in high grades (Lewis, 1986, 1992). 
Some studies found weaker linkages between performance ratings and promotions 
than between performance ratings and salary increases (Castilla, 2008).  In his analysis of 
a large private firm, Mobley (1982) found that the firm’s promotion decisions relied 30 
percent on an employee’s performance rating.   The GAO (2003) also reported that 
performance ratings have only a “modest” impact on promotion chances of federal 
workers.  Part of the reason is that, as Asch (2005) argues, the promotion system requires 
the supervisor to determine who are the best performers but performance ratings do not 
specifically provide performance rankings.  Individual employees’ performance can be 
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rank-ordered, although they are rated as same level of performance, and therefore it is 
possible that some outstanding performers are promoted whereas other outstanding 
performers are not, even if all other factors are equal. 
Although very few studies have empirically tested the relationship between 
performance ratings and promotions, it is clear that performance ratings are positively 
related to promotion probabilities.  Using logit analysis, Powell and Butterfield (1994) 
examined whether gender and other job-related factors including performance ratings 
affected promotion decisions in a cabinet level department where 39 SES positions were 
filled in the periods of 1987-1994, and found that performance ratings had a significant 
effect on promotion decisions.  Lyness and Heilman (2006) analyzed 448 upper-level 
managers in a private company and found that as performance rating1 increased by one 
level, the odds of promotion rose 53 percent for female managers and 13 percent for male 
managers, holding constant age, organizational tenure, education, and organizational 
level.  
Hypothesis 1.5: Highly rated employees are more likely than poorly rated 
employees to be promoted. 
Hypothesis 1.6: Difference in promotion probabilities between highly rated and 
poorly rated employees will be small. 
 
 Rating inflation may affect not only salary increase but promotion probabilities.  
                                               
 
 
1 The variable performance rating has three values from 1 (low) to 3 (high). 
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Hypothesis 1.7: As mean performance ratings have risen over time, the impact of 
performance ratings on promotion probabilities has decreased. 
Hypothesis 1.8: The impact of performance ratings on promotion probabilities is 
smaller in agencies where mean performance ratings are higher. 
 
2.5 Data and Methods 
Data 
This study relies on a one percent random sample of the Central Personnel Data 
File (CPDF).  The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) collects personnel data 
from the federal agencies, except special agencies including U.S. Postal Service, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Imagery 
and Mapping Agency, and the White House Office.  The CPDF contains demographic 
information, job information, the agency of employment and location of employees (U.S. 
Office of Personnel Management, 2008a).   
Each year OPM draws a one percent random sample from the CPDF for study 
purposes based on their social security numbers.  Because employees in the sample one 
year remain in the sample for all years in which they work for the government in April, it 
allows us to track employees over time and to identify promotions.  Because of the 
privacy concerns, OPM declined to provide updated information on employee 
performance ratings, which is the key variable for the study.  So the latest available data 
on individual performance ratings is 2003 and the earliest is 1988.  Thus, this study 
analyzes full-time, white-collar employees from 1988 through 2003.  Because a 
substantial number of federal employees have gone to a pass/fail rating system since 
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1996 but the pass/fail system is too crude to provide a basis for pay and promotion 
decisions (Liff, 2007; Montoya & Graham, 2007), this study restricted the sample to 
employees under five-level rating systems.2  
 
Dependent Variables 
 To measure the impact of performance ratings on personnel decisions, this study 
uses the percentage change in salary and promotion as dependent variables.  Because 
salary level depends largely on employees’ grade, the dollar amount of salary growth is 
higher for higher-grade employees than for lower-grade employees.  That is, even a small 
percentage salary increase for higher-grade employees increases salary by more dollars 
than a high percentage increase for lower-grade employees.  Thus, instead of using actual 
dollar amount for salary growth, this study uses percentage change in salary.  Salary 
growth is measured by the difference in salary between the next year and this year, 
divided by this year’s salary and multiplied by 100.  The variable promotion is coded 1 if 
his or her next year’s grade is higher than this year’s grade and coded 0 for everyone else.  
As shown in Table A.1, the mean percent change in salary is 6.72, and 14.6 percent were 
promoted employees over the 1988-2003 period.     
 
                                               
 
 
2 Although Liff (2007) writes that the goal of pass/fail  system is to “weed out” poor performers, analysis 
on a one percent sample of CPDF shows that among those who were under pass/fail system only 0.12 
percent of federal employees received “fail” ratings and that there is no significant difference in exit rate 
between those who received “pass” and those who received “fail.”  Only a few federal employees are under 
three-level rating system and among those, only a few or no (in some years) employees received the lowest 
rating.  In addition, there is no evidence that the highest rating lead to higher salary increase or higher 
promotion probabilities than mid-level rating, meaning three-level rating system is not much different from 
pass/fail system in terms of the use of the results. 
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Independent Variables 
 Critics argue that performance ratings may not accurately reflect employee 
performance. However, by definition, pay-for-performance is an incentive plan that 
“reward[s] employees based on subjectively rated measures of performance” (Heneman 
& Werner, 2005, p. 6).  The key independent variable is a set of dummy variables for 
performance ratings.  The U.S. Office of Personnel Management categorizes summary 
ratings into five levels: “1 Unacceptable, 2 Level between Fully Successful and 
Unacceptable, 3 Fully Successful or equivalent, 4 Level between Outstanding and Fully 
Successful, and 5 Outstanding or equivalent.”  Because few employees receive the lowest 
two ratings, level 1 or 2, I combined the two into a single category and labeled it less than 
fully successful.  The variables outstanding, exceeds fully successful, and fully successful 
represent level 5, 4, and 3, respectively.  The reference group in the regression and logit 
models is those who received fully successful ratings.  Thus, coefficients on performance 
rating dummy variables show whether the named groups are different from those who 
received fully successful in salary growth and promotion probabilities. 
 This study controls for human capital factors.  Education, federal experience, and 
age are measured in years.  To capture the curvilinear impact of experience on salary 
growth and promotion probability (e.g., salary growth will be faster and promotion 
probability will drop faster early in their careers than later in their careers), I add squared 
term for federal service experience and age.  
 Other individual characteristics also have an impact on career success.  Gender 
and race are common factors that explain pay and promotion inequalities.  The CPDF 
contains five racial categories including American Indians.  Because the sample size for 
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American Indians is small, I dropped the group and created 7 dummy variables for seven 
race and gender group: black male, Hispanic male, Asian male, white female, black 
female, Hispanic female, and Asian female, and use white male as the reference group.  
 Career patterns vary with job-related factors and the agencies in which employees 
work.  Salary rises with grade but promotion probabilities drop.  I create a set of dummy 
variables for each grade level and for the Senior Executive Service, which is labeled as 
grade 16 for convenience.  But because only a few employees are in grades 1 and 2 in the 
sample, I combine grade 1, 2, and 3, and label them as grade 3.  The reference group is 
grade 8.  Following the OPM classification, I create dummy variables for Professional, 
Administrative, Clerical, and Technical occupations with the Other category as the 
reference group.  A dummy variable supervisory status is coded 1 for those whose 
position is a supervisor or manager, and 0 for everyone else.  Organizational factors are 
some of the most important factors affecting performance ratings and personnel decisions 
(Condrey & Brudney, 1992).  Performance ratings vary dramatically by agency (Lewis, 
1997b), so I create agency dummy variables for all cabinet-level departments and the four 
largest independent agencies (the Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services 
Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Social 
Security Administration).  All other agencies are combined and are used as the reference 
group, other agency.     
 
Methods  
 To test the hypotheses, this study first analyzes the full panel data set.  To 
understand the overall picture of performance ratings, salary increases, and promotions, I 
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present the descriptive statistics.  As reviewed above, many factors influence career 
advancement in the federal service, and those factors could be associated with 
performance ratings.  Understanding basic patterns of differences of career advancement 
between performance groups helps to understand how individual and job-related factors 
affect pay increases and promotion probabilities. Therefore, before separating those 
factors from the pure rating effect, I run t-tests to test for differences in career 
advancement between those receiving outstanding and fully successful ratings and 
between those receiving exceeds fully successful and fully successful ratings.  Using 
panel data analysis, I measure the impact of performance ratings on salary increase.  
Since the dependent variable promotion is dichotomous, this study employs panel data 
logit analysis.   
 Two common methods for panel data analysis are fixed effect and random effect 
models.  The random effect model assumes that the unobserved individual effects are not 
correlated with the any of the other regressors, whereas the fixed effect model allows the 
unobserved effect to be correlated with the other explanatory variables.  Because a 
Hausman test for this study rejected the null hypothesis that there is no correlation 
between unobserved individual effects and the other regressors, this study uses the fixed 
effect model.   
 The panel data analysis for this study has weaknesses, however.  The panel data 
set used for this study is unbalanced, because different employees are in the panel for 
different lengths of time, depending on when they entered federal employment and how 
many years they stayed.  In general, unbalanced panel data works with panel data 
analysis as long as the reasons for missing values are random (Wooldridge, 2003), but in 
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this sample, the reason that some observations are dropped is not random but related to 
the purpose of performance appraisals; that is, analysis on the CPDF shows that linkages 
between performance ratings and salary growth are stronger for dropped observations, 
which moved from five-level rating system to pass/fail or three-levels, than for existing 
observations.  The other weakness is that the model includes time invariant variables such 
as race and gender, but the fixed effect model drops variables that do not vary within 
individuals (e.g., gender and race) so that we cannot estimate parameters (Greene, 2003).  
Also, outstanding performers who consistently receive outstanding ratingsare excluded 
from the estimation when we use fixed effect model, which may leads to a biased results.  
Therefore, the primary analysis will be cross-sectional ordinary least square (OLS) and 
logistic regressions.  
 To understand how performance ratings, salary increases, and promotions have 
changed over time, I present the descriptive statistics by year from 1988 to 2003.  To 
examine whether differences in salary increases and promotion probabilities between 
outstanding and fully successful performers are constant over time or rising, falling, 
fluctuating, I run a set of t-tests by year comparing those who received outstanding and 
fully successful ratings.  And then, I conduct ordinary least square regressions year-by-
year during 1988-2002 to examine whether the patterns of salary increases in t-tests hold 
up to multivariate analyses, which control for individual and job-related factors.   
 To estimate the impact of performance ratings on promotion probabilities by each 
year, I use logistic regression analysis.  Because logit analysis assumes that the log-odds 
of promotion are a linear function of the independent variables, the percentage change 
implied by a logit coefficient depends on the values of all the independent variables.  One 
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of this study’s purposes is to measure the size of the impact of performance ratings on 
promotion probabilities, so I use the prchange command in Stata program (Long & 
Freese, 2006), which allows us to calculate the impact of the variable into a percentage 
change, holding all the other variables at their means.   
 Analysis of the full panel data and the OLS and logit analyses allow us to 
examine the impact of ratings on salary increases and promotion probabilities in the 
federal civil service, after controlling for race and gender, education level, federal 
experience, age, supervisory status, grade, PATCO category, and agency.  However, 
because the distribution of performance ratings and the practices regarding salary 
increase and promotion decisions vary with individual and job-related factors, we need 
further analysis to examine how the impact of ratings differs within each subcategory of 
factors.  Among the most important factors are occupation type (PATCO), grade level, 
and agency.  As in the full panel analysis and the cross-sectional analysis by year, I 
present first the descriptive statistics, and then run a set of t-tests, and finally conduct the 
panel data analysis for each category of occupation type (PATCO), grade level, and 
agency. 
 
2.6 Findings 
Analysis of the Full Data Set 
 Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of performance ratings and career 
advancement in the period of 1988-2003.  Federal employees’ performance rating is 
pretty high.  The average performance rating was 4.06, and 73 percent of employees 
received either outstanding (34.6 percent) or exceeds fully successful (38.4 percent) 
 35 
ratings.  The average salary increase was 6.72 percent, and on average, 14.6 percent of 
employees were promoted annually.  
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Performance Ratings and Career Advancement 
 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Performance Rating 4.06 .792 1 5 
% Outstanding 34.6 47.6 0 100 
% Exceeds Fully Successful 38.4 48.6 0 100 
% Change in Salary 6.72 4.74 0 49.7 
% Promoted 14.6 35.3 0 100 
 
 Table 2.2: Career Advancement Comparison: T-test 
 
Mean % Salary Change %  Promoted 
Fully Successful Outstanding Fully successful Outstanding 
7.04** 6.59 15.4** 14.6 
Fully Successful 
Exceeds Fully 
Successful Fully Successful 
Exceeds Fully 
Successful 
7.04** 6.62 15.4** 14.1 
 
 Table 2.2 shows the results of t-tests to compare the differences in career 
advancement between outstanding and fully successful performers and between exceeds 
fully successful and fully successful performers.  Surprisingly, outstanding performers’ 
mean salary increase rate and the percentage of them promoted were lower than for fully 
successful performers.  Mean salary increases were 0.45 percentage points lower and the 
percentage promoted was 0.8 percentage point lower for outstanding performers than for 
fully successful performers.  Fully successful ratings also have advantages over exceeds 
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fully successful ratings in salary increase rate (7.04 vs. 6.62) and percentage promoted 
(15.4 vs. 14.1).    
 However, the t-tests results could be misleading both in terms of the size and sign 
of the difference, because many individual and job-related factors are associated with 
salary increases and promotions, and those factors are also related to the performance 
ratings, but the t-tests do not control for these factors.  In fact, when I ran a regression 
with percent change in salary as the dependent variable and with performance ratings as 
the only independent variable, higher ratings were negatively associated with salary 
increase; but when I added federal experience to the model, the coefficient on 
performance ratings became positive, which indicates that if employees have the same 
years of federal experience, higher performers’ salary increases are higher than lower 
performers’.3 
 Therefore, the panel data analysis tests whether the t-test results hold true even 
after controlling for individual and job-related factors.  As shown in Table 2.3, 
outstanding ratings have a positive impact on salary increases and promotions, when the 
model controls for gender and race, years of education, federal experience, age, 
supervisory status, PATCO category, and agency.  Holding the other variables constant, 
outstanding performers’ salary increases are .06 percentage points higher than fully 
successful performers, but the result is not statistically significant.  The advantage of 
outstanding ratings is clear in promotion.  Outstanding performers’ log-odds of 
                                               
 
 
3 Additional analysis (not shown) indicates that years of federal service is negatively associated with salary 
increase, but more experienced employees were more likely to receive higher performance ratings than less 
experienced employees.  Therefore, the bivariate (or trivariate in this paper) analysis could give us a 
misleading picture of the impact of ratings on salary increases and promotion probabilities. 
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promotion are .268 higher than fully successful performers’ log-odds of promotion, 
holding the other variable constant.  Those who received exceeds fully successful ratings 
also appear to be more likely than those who received fully successful ratings to be 
promoted, though this coefficient is only significant at .05 level in a one-tailed test.  
Coefficients on less than fully successful are negative, as expected, but the results are not 
statistically significant.  The multivariate analysis results contradict the t-test results, 
implying that we need to consider individual and job-related factors to measure the 
impact of ratings on salary increases and promotion probabilities correctly.     
 
Table 2.3: Impact of Performance Ratings on Career Advancement: Panel Model 
 
 Salary Increase  Promotion    
 
Outstanding 0.059 0.268**    
 (1.56) (8.15) 
Exceeds fully -0.040 0.047    
 (1.24) (1.69)   
Less than fully -0.132 -0.152   
 (0.69) (0.80)   
Absolute value of t (for salary increase) and z (for promotion) statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and organizational characteristics    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Analysis by Year 
 Average performance ratings increased steadily until 1999 and the pattern is 
similar to percent of outstanding rating (Table A.2).  However, salary increase and 
promotion do not change consistently with the year, which rejects the Hypothesis 1.3 and 
1.7 that as performance ratings have risen over time, the impact of performance ratings 
on salary increases and promotion probabilities has decreased.  Both average salary 
increase and the percentage promoted were highest in 1988-1990, but average 
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performance rating was lowest in those three years.  Performance ratings were highest in 
1999 with a mean rating of 4.3 and 49.6 percent receiving outstanding rating.  They have 
decreased since then, probably because a substantial number of federal employees moved 
from the five-level rating system to pass/fail or to three-level rating systems. 
 Table A.3 presents the t-test results comparing outstanding and fully successful 
ratings by year.  Differences in salary increases and promotions between outstanding and 
fully successful are statistically significant only in four years.  In addition, outstanding 
performers’ salary increase and promotion rate are higher than fully successful 
performers only in one year and two years, respectively.  To some extent, t-test results 
may be useful to understand basic patterns in the differences of salary increase and 
promotion rate between outstanding and fully successful ratings.  However, as shown in 
above, a variety of individual and job-related factors are associated with salary increases, 
promotions, and performance ratings.  Therefore, the analytical models need to consider 
those factors for more accurate measurement. 
 Table A.4 shows the multiple regression results for percentage change in salary.  
The results partially support Hypothesis 1.1, that salary increase would be higher for 
highly rated employees than for poorly rated employees.  Outstanding ratings do seem to 
have a positive impact on salary increases, but the coefficients on other two rating 
variables are mostly statistically insignificant.  The reference group for performance 
ratings is fully successful, so coefficients on each performance rating show whether the 
named group had higher rates of salary increase than those who received fully successful 
ratings.  Holding the other variables constant, salary increases were 0.2 to 0.6 percentage 
points higher for those who received outstanding than for those who received fully 
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successful in the 1988-2002 period.  The coefficient on outstanding is largest in 1991, 
when the average salary increase was 7.6 percent; thus, a 0.6 percentage point difference 
between those who received outstanding ratings and those who received fully successful 
ratings is quite small.  The results support Hypothesis 1.2, that differences in salary 
increases between highly rated and poorly rated employees would be small.   
 Although the average performance rating increased until 1999, the size of 
coefficients on outstanding does not vary much by year.  The outstanding coefficients 
were 0.2 to 0.3 in 1988-1990, and increased to 0.6 in 1991, and then were 0.2 to 0.5 in 
1992-1999.  The three most recent years’ coefficients were not statistically significant.  
Because a substantial number of federal employees went to pass/fail or three rating 
systems, that change could affect the relationship between outstanding ratings and salary 
increase.  While rating was the least inflated in earlier years and was the most inflated in 
late 1990s, the impact of outstanding ratings on salary increase does not differ between 
two periods.  This finding rejects Hypothesis 1.3, which hypothesized a negative 
relationship between rating inflation and the impact of ratings on salary increase.  
 Salary increases do not differ significantly between exceeds fully successful and 
fully successful.  Coefficients on exceeds fully successful are statistically significant only 
in 2 of the 15 years.  Less than fully successful performers tend to receive lower salary 
increase than fully successful performers, but the results fall short of statistical 
significance.  
 The remaining coefficients show the impact of individual and job-related 
characteristics on salary increases when they received same performance ratings.  Most 
gender and race coefficients are not statistically significant except for white female.  
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Holding the other variables constant, white women tend to receive 0.2 to 0.5 percentage 
points higher salary increase than comparable white men. 
 Education does not seem to have an impact on salary increase.  All the 
coefficients on education (except in 1992) are not statistically significant, which may 
indicate more educated employees are not more productive than less educated employees 
in the same grade, supervisory status, and PATCO category.  In 1992, one additional year 
of education raises the expected salary increase by 0.08 percentage points, holding the 
other independent variables constant.    
 Federal work experience is consistently negatively associated with salary 
increases.  All the coefficients on years of federal service are negative, and they are 
statistically significant in all eight years, ranging from -0.29 to -0.43 percentage points.  
Salary increase rate also drops with age.   
 Supervisors seem to have a salary increase advantage over nonsupervisors.  The 
rate of salary increase is 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points higher for supervisors than for 
nonsupervisors (coefficients are significant in 5 years).  This percentage difference may 
not be comparable with the findings of Johnson and Libecap (1989), which measured 
difference in annual salary between supervisors and nonsupervisors, but the size of 
supervisors’ advantage in salary increase seems to be small compared to 14.2 percentage 
points advantage in annual salary in Johnson and Libecap’s study (1989).   
 Consistent with the previous studies (Lewis, 1997a), the salary increase rate is 
higher in lower grades than in higher grades.  The reference group for grade variables is 
Grade 8, so coefficients on each grade level show the differences in salary increase 
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between the named groups and Grade 8.  Salary increase rate for GS 7 or below is higher 
than Grade 8, but the rate for GS 9 or above is lower than Grade 8. 
 Employees in Professional and Administrative occupations have an advantage in 
salary increases.  Those who are in Professional category are 0.7 to 4.0 percentage points 
higher than those who are in the Other category in their salary increase during 1988-2002 
periods, holding the other variables constant.  Salary increase rates are 1.2 to 3.8 
percentage points higher for employees in the Administrative category than for 
employees in the Other category.  The differences in salary increase rate are highest in 
1990 and lowest in 2002; coefficients on Professional and Administrative are 4.0 and 3.8 
in 1990, and 0.7 and 1.2 in 2002, respectively.  The Technical and Clerical categories do 
not differ significantly from the Other category in salary increase in most years.  
Coefficients on Technical are statistically significant only in two years (0.9 in 1990 and 
0.9 in 2000).  Coefficients on clerical are in general negative, but statically significant 
only in two years (-1.4 in 1988 and -0.9 in 1992).  Professional and Administrative 
occupations in the federal civil service have advantages not only in the level of salary but 
salary increase rate. 
 The rate of salary increase does not vary much across federal agencies; on 
average, the annual salary increase rate is 6.7 percent, with the rate lowest (5.5 percent) 
in the Social Security Administration and highest (7.8 percent) in the Justice Department.  
However, salary increase rate is lower in some agencies, particularly Army, Air Force, 
Navy, and other Defense departments, than in other agencies.  Consistent with Lewis 
(1997a), employees in the Department of Defense and the Army, Air Force, and Navy 
tend to have lower salary increases.  The reference group for agency dummy variables is 
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other agencies, which includes all the federal agencies that are not included in the model.  
Air Force employees’ salary increase rates are 0.5 to 1.2 percentage points lower than the 
reference group, holding individual and other position-related characteristics constant.  
Compared to the employees in other agencies, Army employees have disadvantage in 
salary increase, rating from 0.5 in 1998 to 1.5 percentage points in 1988.  Coefficients on 
Navy are also negative and are statistically significant in four years, indicating Navy 
employees’ salary increase is lower than employees in other agencies.   
 Table A.5 shows the results of logit analysis for promotion probability by year.  
Supporting Hypothesis 1.5, higher ratings are expected to result in higher promotion 
probability.  Outstanding performers are 2.6 to 5.4 percentage points more likely than 
fully successful performers to be promoted, when all the other variables have mean 
characteristics.  Since, on average, only 14.8 percent of employees are promoted each 
year during 1988 to 2003, the differences in promotion probability between outstanding 
performers and fully successful performers are substantial.  Therefore, the results do not 
clearly support Hypothesis 1.6, which hypothesized that difference in promotion 
probabilities between highly rated and poorly rated employees would be small.  Although 
the results are not consistent across years - coefficients are significant in 9 years but the 
sign is negative in 2002 - those who received exceeds fully successful ratings also have 
more chances to be promoted.  Coefficients on exceeds fully successful of .179 in 1992 
and .280 in 1990 (the smallest and greatest among significant coefficients) can be 
translated to expectation that those who received exceeds fully successful are 1.6 to 3.4 
percentage points more likely to be promoted than comparable employees those who 
received fully successful ratings, among employees with mean characteristics.  The 
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coefficient on less than fully successful is consistently negative, although the coefficients 
fall short of statistical significance.  Castilla (2008) argues that performance ratings have 
a weaker impact on promotions than on salary increases, but the results of this study 
show that while only outstanding ratings lead to salary increases higher than those for 
with fully successful ratings, both exceeds fully successful and outstanding ratings raise 
promotion probabilities relative to fully successful ratings.  
 Findings on other control variables are as follows.  Race and gender do not seem 
to have an impact on promotion chances when performance ratings and other individual 
and job-related factors are controlled.  But, unexpectedly, years of education are 
positively associated with promotion probabilities.  Coefficients on education are positive 
and are statistically significant in 8 years.  One additional year of education around its 
mean raises promotion probability by 0.4 (in 1990) to 0.8 percent points, when the other 
variables are set their means.   
 Consistent with Lewis (1997a), federal experience and age have negative impacts 
on promotion probabilities.  The coefficients on federal experience are negative and 
statistically significant in all 15 years.  Age coefficients are negative and significant in 
four years.  Consistent with Asch (2001), supervisors’ promotion probabilities do not 
differ from those of nonsupervisors; the coefficients are consistently positive but 
significant only in three years.   
 Promotion probability drops with grade level.  The patterns are similar to the 
relationship between grade level and salary increases. The coefficients are positive until 
grade 7, but are negative from grade 11 to 15.  The reference group for grade dummy 
variables is Grade 8, so the results can be interpreted that those who are in GS 3-7 are 
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more likely but those who are in GS 11-15 are less likely than those who are in GS 8 to 
be promoted. 
 The percentage of employees who were promoted was lowest in Professional and 
Administrative occupations.  However, when the model controlled for performance 
ratings and individual and job-related factors, promotion probabilities were the highest 
among Professional and Administrative occupations.  Employees in Professional 
occupations are 3.9 to 20.6 percentage points more likely to be promoted than employees 
in the Other category, holding the other variables at their means.  Promotion probabilities 
are 8.3 to 18.6 percentage points higher for those who are in the Administrative category 
than for those who are in the Other category, when they have mean characteristics.  As in 
the case of salary increase, there is no significant difference in promotion probability 
among comparable employees in the Technical, Clerical, and Other categories.  
   Promotion probabilities vary across federal agencies.  In particular, consistent 
with Lewis (1997a), promotion chances are lower in the Department of Defense and the 
three military departments.  Promotion chances are lowest in the Veterans Affairs and 
Agriculture but are highest in Transportation. 
 
Analysis by Subcategory 
Analysis by PATCO Category 
 The average salary increase is higher for Administrative (7.1 percent) and 
Professional (6.7 percent) than Technical (6.3 percent) and Clerical (6.5 percent) 
employees (Table A.6), probably because Professional and Administrative occupations 
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are two-grade interval series.  Promotion probabilities, on the other hand, are higher for 
Technical and Clerical than for Professional and Administrative occupations.  
 The t-tests results are shown in Table A.7.  Also oddly, the mean salary increase 
is higher for those who received fully successful than for those who received outstanding 
in each of five PATCO categories, although the differences are small (from 0.3 to 0.6 
percentage points).  Promotion probabilities are higher for fully successful performers 
than for outstanding performers, but the difference is statistically significant only in 
Professional and Administrative occupations.  However, simple comparison of mean 
percent salary change and percentage promoted between two groups might be misleading, 
so multivariate analysis is used to measure the impact of ratings in each of five PATCO 
categories. 
 Table A.8 shows the results of panel data analysis for percent change in salary 
increase by PATCO category.  Surprisingly, outstanding ratings have significant impact 
on salary increase only for Technical employees.  Holding the other variables constant, 
outstanding performers’ salary increase rate is 0.2 percent points higher than fully 
successful performers.  Coefficients on outstanding in the other four groups are 
statistically insignificant, implying that performance ratings are not determinants in 
salary increase within same occupational category, when employees are the same race 
and gender and supervisory status, have the same levels of education, federal experience, 
age, and grade, and work in the same agencies. 
 Table A.9 shows the results of rating impact on promotion probability by PATCO 
category.  Unlike salary increases, for which outstanding ratings had a significant impact 
only for Technical employees , promotion chances are higher for outstanding performers 
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than for fully successful employees in all five PATCO categories.  The log-odds of 
promotion for outstanding is .20 and .45 higher than the log-odds of promotion for fully 
successful in Professional and Other occupations, respectively, holding the other 
variables constant.  Even exceeds fully successful ratings have a significant impact on 
promotion probabilities in Clerical occupations.  The findings indicate that performance 
ratings are predictors of promotion probability within each occupation group. 
 
Analysis by Grade Level 
 Salary increase rate and promotion probabilities drop with grade level, except for 
some middle grades (Table A.10).  GS 7 and GS 9 employees’ salary increase and 
promotion probabilities are higher than employees who are one-grade lower than them.  It 
may be because college graduates and master’s degree holders who are in Professional 
and Administrative occupations typically start their careers at GS 7 and GS 9, 
respectively, and are promoted two levels at a time until GS 11.  On the other hand, 
performance ratings are higher at higher grades. 
 Table A.11 shows t-test results by grade level.  Outstanding performers’ salary 
increase rate is lower than fully successful performers until grade 8, and is consistently 
higher from grade 12 to 15.  The pattern is similar to promotion probabilities.  
Outstanding performers do not receive consistently higher promotion probabilities than 
fully successful performers until grade 10, but outstanding ratings have a promotion 
advantage over fully successful ratings from grade 11 to grade 15. 
 Table A.12 shows the results of panel data analysis for percent change in salary 
increase by grade.  The coefficients on outstanding are all positive, but are statistically 
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significant in only five of 14 grades.  Receiving an outstanding rating has a significant 
impact on salary increases for the low grades (GS 1-3 and 5) and middle grades (GS 9, 11 
and 12).  The impact of outstanding ratings is greatest for employees who are GS 1-3.  
Outstanding performers’ salary increase rate is 1.4 percentage points higher than fully 
successful performers, holding the other variables constant.  This advantage is 
substantial, considering the mean percent change in salary for GS 1-3 is 7.8.  Other than 
that group, the size of the outstanding rating impact is small or is not statistically 
significant.  In particular, salary increase does not seem to be a function of performance 
ratings for the top 4 grades.  Exceeds fully successful ratings have advantages in salary 
increase in three grades (GS 5, 9, and 11).  For those groups, salary increase rate is 0.2 to 
0.4 percentage points higher for exceeds fully successful performers than for fully 
successful performers.  The results indicate that in most grades, outstanding ratings have 
a small impact on salary increases within same grade, when employees’ individual 
characteristics and job-related factors are controlled for. 
 The results of rating impact on promotion probability by agency are shown in 
Table A.13.  The patterns are a bit different from those for salary increase.  Coefficients 
on outstanding are positive (except for GS 6), and are statistically significant in five years, 
indicating outstanding ratings have advantages over fully successful ratings in 
promotions.  Similar to the salary increase, outstanding performers’ promotion 
probability is greater than fully successful performers, when they are low grades (GS 4 
and 5) and middle-levels (GS 9, 11, and 10).  Most coefficients on exceeds fully 
successful and less than fully successful are not statistically significant, implying that 
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only outstanding ratings have an impact on promotion probability among employees who 
are in the same grades. 
 
Analysis by Agency 
 Salary increase and promotion probabilities vary across federal agencies (Table 
A.14).  The Department of Justice’s mean percent change in salary is 7.8 percent, 
whereas that of the Social Security Administration is 5.6 percent.  On average, 22.3 
percent of Commerce employees were promoted, but only 11.9 percent of Veterans 
Affairs employees were promoted in 1988-2003 periods.  Performance ratings vary 
dramatically across agencies.  While the mean performance rating is 4.5 and 60.6 percent 
of Army employees received outstanding ratings, mean performance rating is 3.4 and 
only 11.2 percent of Social Security Administration employees are identified as 
outstanding performers. 
 Table A.15 shows the t-test results by agency.  Outstanding performers’ salary 
increase and promotion rate are not consistently higher or lower than fully successful 
performers in federal agencies.  For example, the mean percentage change in salary is 1.2 
percentage points lower for outstanding performers than for fully successful performers 
in the Army, but the salary increase rate is 0.6 percentage points higher for outstanding 
performers than for fully successful performers in the Department of Energy.  Because 
individual characteristics as well as organizational factors are associated with salary 
increase, promotion, and performance ratings, these t-test results could be misleading.  
 Table A.16 shows the results of panel data analysis for percent change in salary 
increase by agency.  Oddly, many coefficients on outstanding are negative, though the 
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results are not statistically significant.  The coefficients on outstanding are significant 
only in Commerce Department and Other Agencies.  Outstanding performers’ salary 
increase rate is 0.7 and 0.6 percent points higher than fully successful performers in 
Commerce Department and Other Agencies, respectively, holding the other variables 
constant.  
 Table A.17 presents the rating impact on promotion probability by agency.  Again, 
patterns for promotion probability are quite a bit different from the case of salary increase.  
Most coefficients are positive, and outstanding ratings have a significant impact on 
promotion probability in seven federal agencies.  In particular, although the results are 
statistically insignificant, outstanding ratings were negatively associated with salary 
increase in three federal agencies (Air Force, Agriculture, and Health and Human 
Services), but outstanding ratings are significant factors for promotion in those three 
agencies.  On the other hand, differences in salary increases between outstanding and 
fully successful performers were greatest in the Commerce Department with 0.7 percent 
point difference, but differences in promotion probabilities are not significant for the 
department .   
 In sum, Hypothesis 1.1 indicated that higher ratings would lead to higher salary 
increases than lower ratings, but the results of panel data analysis only partially support 
the hypothesis.  Supporting Hypothesis 1.2, differences in salary increases between 
highly rated and poorly rated employees were small, even when the results were 
statistically significant.  In Hypothesis 1.3, I hypothesized a negative relationship 
between rating inflation and the impact of ratings on salary increase, but the results reject 
the hypothesis.  The results reject Hypothesis 1.4, that the impact of performance ratings 
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on salary increase would be smaller in agencies where performance ratings were more 
inflated.  Mean ratings were average in Commerce and Other Agencies but their impact 
on salary increases were greatest in the two agencies, whereas Social Security 
Administration, Veterans Affairs, and Transportation were the least inflated but 
outstanding ratings were not associated with salary increase in these agencies.  
 Overall, the results of panel analysis support Hypothesis 1.5, that highly rated 
employees were more likely than poorly rated employees to be promoted.  The 
outstanding ratings have substantial advantage over fully successful ratings in promotion 
probabilities, so the results do not support Hypothesis 1.6, Hypothesis 1.6, which 
hypothesized that difference in promotion probabilities between highly rated and poorly 
rated employees would be small.  The results reject 1.7 that as performance ratings have 
risen over time, the impact of performance ratings on salary increases and promotion 
probabilities has decreased.  Hypothesis 1.8 suggested that the impact of ratings on 
promotion probabilities would be small in inflated agencies, but the results do not support 
the hypothesis.  There is no consistent finding for the relationships between rating 
inflation of agencies and the rating-promotion decision linkage.   
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 Linking rewards to performance is a key element for successful performance-
based rewards system.  However, many observers argue that performance-pay 
relationship is weak in the federal service, often without providing empirical data.  This 
study provides empirical evidence on the impact of performance ratings on pay increases 
and promotion probabilities in the federal service.  In general, performance ratings do not 
seem to have much impact on salary increases.  Outstanding ratings only have a 
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significant impact on salary increases in some low and middle grades, in Technical 
occupations, and in the Commerce department.  Although, the results of cross-sectional 
analysis are statistically significant in most years, the size of the difference in salary 
increases between outstanding and fully successful performers is small.  However, 
because so many factors come into play in determining salary increases, and because the 
performance rating-salary increase relationship is not consistent across grade levels, 
occupation types, and agencies, we must not simply generalize that performance ratings 
have weak impact on salary increase.  For employees in Grade 5, for instance, the t-tests 
showed that salary increase was significantly higher for those who received fully 
successful than for those who received outstanding ratings, but when the panel model 
controlled for individual and job-related factors, outstanding ratings have significant 
advantages over fully successful ratings in salary increase.  Also, while in most 
occupation types and federal agencies, outstanding ratings did not significantly impact 
salary increases, the benefit of outstanding ratings in salary increase was significant in 
Technical occupation and in Commerce Department. 
 The patterns for promotion probabilities differed substantially from those for 
salary increases.  Outstanding ratings were valuable for promotion in many grades, in all 
occupation categories, and in some federal agencies.  In addition, those receiving 
outstanding and exceeds fully successful ratings had significant advantages in promotion 
in most years.  These results imply that federal agencies use performance ratings more 
seriously for promotion decisions than for salary increases, probably because promotion 
decisions have a greater impact on individual career advancement and have an impact on 
organizational performance for longer periods of time than annual salary increase 
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decisions.  Therefore, the argument that performance-rewards link is weak could be 
partially correct, if it considers only pay-performance relationships.   
 The findings suggest that future studies need to analyze a variety of aspects of the 
use of performance ratings.  According to the CSRA of 1978, federal agencies should use 
performance appraisal results not only for pay and promotion decisions but for other 
purposes, including retention and termination.  A new OPM director, John Berry, 
appointed by the President Obama, said that one goal of pay-for-performance reform 
plans is to retaining good performers by providing them with large enough rewards 
compared to the private sector companies.  However, little is known about whether 
performance-based reward is effective in retaining good performers.    
 Although this study provides starting points for understanding the relationship 
between performance ratings and rewards in a quantifiable manner, the most recent data 
used for this study is 2003.  The federal government has experienced dramatic changes in 
performance-based reward systems since 2003.  Therefore, future study should use more 
recent data which reflect most important change including pay-for-performance systems 
in Homeland Security and Defense Departments. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PERFORMANCE RATINGS AND GENDER AND RACIAL 
INEQUALITIES IN CAREER SUCCESS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Despite governments’ efforts to achieve equal employment and affirmative action, 
gender and racial disparities in career success persist in the U.S. workforce.  Shrek (2007) 
argues that increased use of performance pay is increasing income inequality.  Inequality 
rises, he says, because good performers are rewarded on their high productivity.  If 
performance appraisal provides an unbiased and objective measurement of employee 
performance, the disadvantages of women and minorities in career success could be 
explained by their lower performance ratings, which arise from their lower productivity.  
However, studies found that linkages between performance ratings and rewards are weak 
(Pearce & Perry, 1983; Rynes et al., 2005; Smith & Rupp, 2003), suggesting the 
possibility that women and minorities may not be recognized from the organizations in 
their high performance so that women and minorities’ high performance ratings are not 
connected to the rewards.   
 Castilla (2008) presents two possible ways in which performance ratings could 
contribute to the disadvantages women and minorities face in career success.  First, 
discrimination could occur in the performance appraisal process: women and minorities 
could receive lower performance ratings than comparable white males with the same 
performance level, which he calls “performance-evaluation bias.”  Second, women and 
minorities could receive lower returns on the same level of performance ratings than 
white males (“performance-reward bias”).  
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 Although many studies have examined factors affecting gender and racial 
differences in career success, studies that try to connect gender and racial inequalities to 
managerial tools are scarce.  This study explores whether performance ratings help 
explain women’s and minorities’ disadvantages in career success.  Specifically, this study 
addresses two research questions: 1) Do women and minorities receive lower 
performance ratings than comparable white males in the federal service? and 2) Do high 
performance ratings increase salaries and promotion probabilities less for women than 
men and for minorities than whites?  By showing whether discrimination occurs at the 
performance evaluation stage or at the rewards stage or both, this study adds new 
perspective on gender and racial inequality in career success.   
 This paper is composed of seven sections.  Section 3.2 presents theories that 
explain why women and minorities do not achieve the same career success as men and 
whites, and reviews literature on whether performance ratings are objective and accurate.  
Section 3.3 reviews how individual and job-related characteristics are related to 
performance ratings, salary increases, and promotions.  Section 3.4 develops hypotheses 
on the performance-evaluation bias and performance-reward bias.  Section 3.5 explains 
data, variables, and research method.  In Section 3.6, I present the findings and discuss 
hypotheses.  Section 3.7 summarizes the findings and discusses the implication of the 
study.  
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Determinants of Career Success 
According to human capital theory, investment in education and training raises 
the productivity of workers, and hence increases their earnings by providing skills and 
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knowledge that employers reward them for (Becker, 1993; Mincer, 1993).  A number of 
empirical studies support this theory (e.g., Mincer, 1993; Murphy & Welch, 1992).  For 
example, Murphy and Welch (1992) found that college-educated employees earned 40 
percent and 58 percent more than high school graduates in 1963 and in 1989, respectively.  
Barkley et al.  (1999) showed that master’s degree holders earned 20.3 percent more than 
bachelor’s degree holders in starting salary, after controlling for college major, career 
experience, family and demographic variables.  In fact, empirical studies explained the 
reduced gender and race-based pay gap due to the increased years of schooling (O'Neill 
& Polachek, 1993) and to the improved contents of schooling (e.g., high-paying college 
majors such as engineering and business) for women and minorities (Loury, 1997).  
However, many studies show the existence of gender and racial disparities in earnings 
even after controlling for human capital (e.g., Alkadry & Tower, 2006; Ortiz & Roscigno, 
2009; Padavic & Reskin, 2002).   
 Labor market discrimination theory attributes pay disparities and occupational 
segregation to employers’ prejudice against the disadvantaged groups (Becker, 1971; 
Blau et al., 2006).  Employers are reluctant to hire some group of people who are subject 
to the taste for discrimination from employers themselves, employees, and customers.  
Under imperfect information on the productivity of job applicants, employers, 
particularly risk-averse employers, make hiring decision based on past statistics to avoid 
costly mistakes, so that employers are unwilling to hire some group of people who were 
on average less productive than others (Phelps, 1972).  Employees may not want to work 
with a certain group of people, and customers also may prefer to be served by some 
group of people than others.  From employers’ point of view, hiring people who are 
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discriminated against by their coworkers and customers is not rational because cost for 
hiring the disadvantaged group is their wage plus “discrimination coefficient,” which 
measures the strength of discrimination in terms of money whereas cost for hiring the 
privileged group is just their wage (Blau et al., 2006).  
 Glass ceiling theory, on the other hand, focuses on the limited advancement of 
women and minorities in hierarchical organizations.  According to Cotter et al. (2001), an 
“unseen, yet unbreachable barrier … keeps minorities and women from rising to the 
upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications and achievements” 
(p. 656).  Many empirical studies support the glass ceiling theory.  Kelly et al. (1991) 
compared career advancement between men and women in six state governments and 
found that mobility into the upper-level positions occurs at a higher rate for men than for 
women.  Miller et al. (1999) analyzed city government data, provided by the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, and found that women are highly concentrated on 
redistributive agencies where average pay level is lower than distributive and regulatory 
agencies. Using three sources of information: the CPDF, focus group interviews, and a 
survey conducted by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Naff (1994) analyzed 
federal agencies and argued that experience and education only partly explained gender 
differences in advancement.  However, in general, the glass ceiling is less prevalent in the 
public sector than in the private sector.  Compared to the private sector, a higher 
percentage of senior managers in the federal government are women (Stivers, 2002) and a 
higher percentage of professionals in the public sector are women (Peterson & Lewis, 
1999).  
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 Each of these theories explains part of the reason why there is difference in career 
success between men and women and between whites and minorities, but studies based 
on these theories do not focus on the human resource management tools by which pay 
and promotion decisions are made.   
 
Accuracy of Performance Ratings 
 Performance appraisals stand on the assumption that supervisors can measure 
subordinates’ performance accurately and objectively.  According to Milkovich and 
Wigdor (1991), “supervisors can give reliable ratings of employee performance under 
controlled conditions and with a carefully developed rating scales.  In addition, there is 
indirect evidence that supervisors can make moderately accurate performance ratings” (p. 
66).  Attitudes of federal employees on the accuracy of performance ratings are overall 
positive but not very high.  According to the 2005 Merit Principles Survey, 54 percent of 
federal employees agreed or strongly agreed that “In my work unit, performance ratings 
accurately reflect job performance,” and 67 percent of respondents positively answered 
that “My supervisor rates my performance fairly and accurately” (U.S. Merit Systems 
Protection Board, 2005). 
 However, many kinds of rater errors are hard to avoid.  The performance 
appraisal process involves raters applying performance criteria and standards to 
individual employees, and different raters may interpret the criteria and standards 
differently.  Not only because of measurement itself, but because of rational behavior of 
supervisors, performance ratings may not accurately reflect employee performance 
(Klingner & Nalbandian, 1998; Murphy, 2008; Nigro et al., 2007; Rynes et al., 2005).  
For example, Murphy (2008) argues that “performance appraisal is a complex event that 
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occurs in environments that often push raters to distort their ratings to accomplish valued 
goals or to avoid the negative repercussions of giving ratings their subordinates or 
superiors will find objectionable” (p. 198).  Nigro et al. (2007) also argue that accurate 
ratings are not rewarded by the organization, and “negative ratings often yield nothing 
more than stressful interpersonal conflict and time-consuming appeals by resentful 
workers to suspicious civil service boards” (p. 170).   
 Some types of rater errors do not particularly distinguish a certain group of 
employees from others: the halo effect is an inappropriate generalization of one aspect of 
an employee’s performance to other areas, and central tendency error is an inclination to 
rate employees in the middle of the scale even when their performance is higher or lower 
than the average.  However, other types of errors are related to race, gender, or other 
nontask factor-based errors.  For example, the similar-to-me effect, which refers to the 
tendency of raters to give higher rating to those who resemble themselves, indicates that 
nontask factors such as gender, race, and age can affect performance ratings (Boyd, 2004; 
Kellough, 2002). Some empirical studies have found that performance ratings are lower 
for women (Griffeth & Bedeian, 1989; Williams & Walker, 1985), racial minorities 
(Elvira & Town, 2001; McKinney & Collins, 1991), and older employees (Cleveland & 
Landy, 1981), though others do not. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
Performance-Evaluation Bias 
 Many studies have found that the gender and race of the ratees have an impact on 
employee performance ratings, but have suggested mixed results on performance-
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evaluation bias, both on gender and race.  While some studies showed that women 
receive lower performance ratings than men, other studies found no difference in 
performance ratings between men and women, or found women received higher ratings 
than men.  Miller and Judith (2002) concluded that women consistently received lower 
performance ratings than men, particularly in male-dominant organizations .  Similarly, 
several studies found that racial minorities receive lower performance ratings than whites 
because raters give higher ratings to ratees of the same race (Stauffer & Buckley, 2005).  
Lewis (1997b) found that minorities are less likely than whites to receive outstanding 
ratings, the highest ratings offered by the federal government. 
 McKinney and Collins (1991), on the other hand, showed that women received 
higher performance ratings than men.  They tested the possibility of performance 
appraisal bias in major metropolitan park and recreation agencies by analyzing the 
combination of raters’ and ratees’ gender, race, and age, and found that both male and 
female raters gave a higher ratings to female ratees.  In his analysis of federal agencies, 
Lewis (1997b) found that women received higher performance ratings than white men at 
the same grades in the same agencies.  Drazin and Auster (1987) analyzed a single large 
financial services organization and found no significant difference in performance ratings 
between men and women at the same level.   
 However, DiTomaso and Smith (1996) argued that “there is not clear evidence 
that white women and minorities are rated lower on performance evaluations” (p. 97).  
Waldman & Avolio (1991) also argued that there is little or no racial bias in performance 
ratings and the lower ratings of blacks simply reflect their lower job-related ability and 
experiences.  Based on the review, I test the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 2.1: Women and minorities received the same performance ratings as 
comparable white males.   
Hypothesis 2.2: Women and minorities received lower performance ratings than 
comparable men and whites when the positions were upper levels. 
Hypothesis 2.3: Women received lower performance ratings than comparable 
men in male-dominant occupations.  
 
Performance-Rewards Bias 
 Many studies support performance-reward bias.  Gerhart (1990) showed that each 
additional average performance rating point resulted in a 16 percent increase in current 
salary for men but only a 10 percent increase for women.  Lyness and Judiesch (1999) 
found that nonpromoted women received higher performance ratings than nonpromoted 
men and that after controlling for age, education, tenure, and level, promoted women also 
received higher ratings than promoted men.  Lyness and Heilman (2006) suggested that 
gender explains 6 percent of the variance in performance ratings and that among 
promoted employees, women’s performance ratings are higher than men’s ratings.  Using 
data from a large private company, Castilla (2008)4 found that salary increase is lower for 
blacks and Hispanics than for comparable whites and that women’s salary increase is 
lower than men’s, after controlling for performance ratings.  Drazin and Auster (1987) 
found that at lower levels each increase in performance rating point leads to almost the 
same salary increases for both men and women, but that at managerial levels each 
                                               
 
 
4 Castilla did not check performance-evaluation bias, but in his preliminary analysis he found that 
performance evaluation distributions do not differ by gender and race.  
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additional performance rating point led to higher salary increase for men than for women.  
On the contrary, Elvira and Town (2001) found that salary differences between blacks 
and whites disappeared when performance ratings were controlled.    
Hypothesis 2.4: Higher performance ratings gave the same salary increases to 
men and women and to whites and minorities.  
Hypothesis 2.5: Higher performance ratings increased salaries less for women 
and minorities than for men and whites in upper-level positions. 
Hypothesis 2.6: Higher performance ratings increased salaries less for women 
than for men in male-dominant occupations. 
 
 With regard to gender differences in promotion probability, the results of studies 
are mixed.  One group of studies found that promotion probabilities are lower for women 
and minorities than for white men (Blau & DeVaro, 2006; Cobb-Clark, 2001; Paulin & 
Mellor, 1996).  For example, Paulin & Mellor (1996) found that white men are 17 
percentage points more likely than minority men to be promoted, after controlling for 
performance ratings, and they argued that the system of rules governing men’s promotion 
is different from that of women and minorities.  In other words, higher performance 
ratings lead to higher promotion probabilities for women and minorities, but there is no 
evidence that performance ratings are related to promotion probabilities for men.  Other 
studies show that women’s promotion rate is as high or higher than men (Hersch & 
Viscusi, 1996; Krull, 2006; Lewis, 1986, 1992).  According to Hersch and Viscusi 
(1996), a higher percentage of women than men receive promotions because women tend 
to be employed at lower levels of the organization.  Using the Department of Defense 
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Civilian Personnel Data Files,  Spyropoulos (2005) showed that women’s promotion rate 
is 23 percent higher than men’s, holding demographic and human capital factors constant.  
Lewis (1986) found that white men and women have similar promotion probabilities in 
the federal government after controlling for individual characteristics. 
Hypothesis 2.7: Higher performance ratings gave the same promotion 
probabilities between men and women and between whites and minorities. 
Hypothesis 2.8: Higher performance ratings had lower promotion probabilities 
for women and minorities than for men and whites when the positions are upper 
levels. 
Hypothesis 2.9: Higher performance ratings had lower promotion probabilities 
for women than for men in male-dominant occupations. 
 
3.4 Other Factors Affecting Performance Ratings, Salary Increases, and Promotions  
 
 Do women and minorities receive different rewards purely because of their 
gender and racial status?  Performance ratings may vary with individual and position 
characteristics.  Studies also show that individual and job-related factors affect salary 
(increases) and promotions.  Therefore, we need to check whether performance-
evaluation bias and performance-reward bias exist, when women and men and minorities 
and whites have similar individual characteristics and hold comparable positions.  This 
section reviews how individual and job-related characteristics could be related to 
performance ratings and organizational rewards. 
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Education 
 Better-educated workers earn more than less-educated ones because education 
improves skills and productivity (Becker, 1993; Mincer, 1993) or because education 
signals  a likelihood of productivity (Belman & Heywood, 1991; Hungerford & Solon, 
1987).  If education raises a worker’s productivity, more educated workers’ performance 
ratings would be higher than for those less educated.  Lewis (1997b), however, found that 
probability of receiving outstanding ratings decreased with education  in federal agencies.  
Nevertheless, years of schooling is positively associated with earning levels, though 
Lewis (1986; Lewis, 1997a) finds education is negatively associated with salary increase 
and has no or only trivial impact on promotion probability in the federal government.    
 
Federal Experience 
 Work experience increases job knowledge, which in turn increases workers’ 
performance (Schmidt et al., 1986).  Therefore, more experienced workers should be 
more likely to receive higher performance ratings than less experienced workers.  Lewis 
(1997b) found that the probability of receiving outstanding ratings increased up to 12 to 
18 years of federal service, then declined, probably because federal employees’ work 
motivation is higher in their early career than in their late careers.  On the other hand, 
salary increases and promotion probabilities drop with federal experience (Lewis, 1986, 
1997a)    
   
Age 
 According to Vroom (1964), work performance is a function of ability and 
motivation, which may change over time.  But, the results of the empirical studies on the 
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relationship between age and productivity are mixed.  While cognitive ability declines 
with age, verbal ability is stable throughout working life (Skirbekk, 2003).  Avolio et al. 
(1990) introduce conflict possibility that  work motivation is low for older employees but 
that loyalty to the organization and turnover rate are low for older employees. Therefore, 
empirical studies have found that age is either negatively related (Cox & Nkomo, 1992; 
Rhodes, 1983) or not related (McEvoy & Cascio, 1989) or curvilinearly related (Sturman, 
2003) with the productivity.  Consistent with Struman (2003), Lewis (1997b) showed that 
likelihood of receiving outstanding ratings increase up to a certain age, then decrease in 
the federal civil service.  Lewis (1997a) also found that salary increases and promotion 
chances drop with age in the federal agencies.   
 
Sex-type of Occupation 
 Some federal occupations are female-dominant (Lewis, 1996) and the proportion 
of women in occupations are associated with performance rating distribution, salary 
increases, and promotion probability. Federal employees in female-dominant occupations 
are more likely to receive outstanding ratings than comparable employees in male-
dominant occupations, although the relationship is not linear  (Lewis, 1997b).  Salary 
level is lower for female-dominant occupations  (Catanzarite, 2003; Cohen & Huffman, 
2003), but women’s promotion probability is high in female-dominant occupations 
(Reskin et al., 1999). 
 
Grade Level 
 Performance ratings rise with grade level in the federal civil service (Lewis, 
1997b), but salary increase rate and promotion probabilities drop with grade level.  Naff 
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(1994) showed that average promotion rate is about 10 percent or below for GS 13-GS 15, 
whereas the rate is 33 to 44 percents for GS 9.  Lewis (1997a) found that promotion 
probabilities are highest for GS1-GS3, and decrease with grade level increases.  Because 
advancement to a higher grade leads to about 10 percent increase in salary in the federal 
civil service (Spyropoulos, 2005), but promotion chances are lower for higher grade 
employees, salary increases rate would be lower for higher grade employees.  
 
Supervisory Status 
 Federal supervisors receive higher performance ratings than nonsupervisors 
(Lewis, 1997b), probably because federal supervisory selection emphasizes technical 
skills (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2001) so that good performers are selected 
as supervisors, and because the second-line supervisors are reluctant to give lower ratings 
to the first-line supervisors who are in the leadership positions than nonsupervisors  
Although the federal government pays supervisors more than nonsupervisors (Asch, 
2001; Johnson & Libecap, 1989), salary increase rate and promotion probability may not 
differ between supervisors and nonsupervisors.  For example, Asch (2001) analyzed 
Department of Defense civil service personnel file from 1982 through 1996 and found 
that supervisors’ promotion speed is not faster than nonsupervisors.     
  
PATCO Category 
 Federal white-collar positions are classified into five broad occupational 
categories: Professional, Administrative, Technical, Clerical, and Other (PATCO), based 
on “the subject matter of work, the level of difficulty or responsibility involved, and the 
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educational requirements” (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2002b, p. 242).  
Because educational and experience requirements for entry are highest for Professional 
and Administrative occupations, employees in Professional and Administrative categories 
have advantages over employees in other three categories in career advancement.  In 
general, promotions are granted two grades at a time from GS 5 through GS 11 for 
Professional and Administrative occupations, whereas Technical and Clerical employees 
are promoted one grade at a time (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2002a).  
Because promotion to a higher grade results in higher salary increase than normal annual 
salary increase, Professional and Administrative employees have a salary advantage.  
Performance ratings, on the other hand, are highest for Technical and Clerical employees.  
According to Lewis (1997b), employees in Technical and Clerical occupations are most 
likely to receive outstanding ratings.   
 
Agency 
 Performance ratings vary greatly across federal agencies. Using a one percent 
sample of CPDF from 1990 through 1995, Lewis (1997b) found that Defense employees 
receive high ratings whereas employees in the departments of Agriculture, Labor, 
Treasury, Interior, Transportation, and Veterans Affair receive low ratings.  Alonso and 
Lewis (2001) used 1996 Merit Principles Survey and 1991 Survey of Federal Employees 
and showed that Agriculture, Transportation, Treasury, OPM, and Labor employees are 
least likely to receive outstanding ratings and that State and Defense employees are most 
likely to receive outstanding ratings.  
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 Career advancement practices also differ among federal agencies.  Borjas (1980; 
Borjas, 1982) argued that federal salary rate is negatively associated with the size of the 
agency, and using a CPDF he showed that employee salary rate is highest in Labor 
Department and is lowest in Defense and Agriculture.  Salary increases and promotion 
probabilities are lower in Defense agencies than in domestic agencies (Lewis, 1997a).      
 
3.5 Data and Methods 
Data 
 As a model employer, the federal government has been trying to rectify gender 
and racial inequalities in career success.  So the federal government is a good site to 
analyze how performance ratings are associated with gender and racial inequalities in 
career success.  This study analyzes a one percent sample of the Central Personnel Data 
File (CPDF).  The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) systemically collects a 
variety of personnel data on federal employees and annually selects a one percent random 
sample based on the final three digits of the employee’s Social Security Number for study 
purpose.  Because an employee remains in the sample as long as she works for the federal 
government, the samples are random but not independent.  
 OPM collects employee performance rating information, but due to privacy 
concerns, it declined to provide updated information on performance rating.  The most 
recent CPDF this study uses is 2003 and the oldest data that contains performance rating 
information is 1988.  Thus, this study analyzes full-time federal employees from 1988 
through 2003.   
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 Federal performance appraisals have been decentralized since 1995 and a 
substantial number of federal employees have moved from five-level rating systems to 
pass/fail or other rating systems.  In this sample, employees who are under pass/fail 
system increased from 5.5 percent in 1998 to 36.6 percent in 2003, whereas those who 
are under five-level ratings decreased to from 92.1 percent in 1998 to 53.6 percent in 
2003.  However, the results of pass/fail (or three level rating systems5) do not provide 
meaningful information with which to make personnel decisions (Liff, 2007; Montoya & 
Graham, 2007), this study restricted the sample to employees under the five-level rating 
system. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variable for testing performance-evaluation bias is performance 
rating.  Federal employees receive one of five rating levels, ranging from level 1 
(unacceptable) to level 5 (outstanding).  However, because only a few employees receive 
levels 1 and 2, I combined the three lowest rating categories to enhance the 
appropriateness of the analysis.6  Therefore, performance rating is an ordinal level 
variable with three categories.  
   To check performance-rewards bias, I use percent change in salary and 
promotion as dependent variables, because salary and promotion are the best-known 
                                               
 
 
5Analysis on this data shows that most employees who are under three-level ratings received mid level or 
higher. For example, only one out of 762 employees under three-levels received the lowest rating in 2003.  
In addition, there was no difference in salary growth and promotion probabilities between the highest and 
the mid-level employees.   
6 In addition, no one in some race and gender groups received either level 1 or 2.  This caused the Brant test 
of the proportionality of odds assumption to fail. 
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rewards for outstanding employees.  One of the greatest salary determinants in the federal 
government is an employee’s grade.  On average, women’s grade is lower than men, and 
therefore there is possibility that even with women’s higher salary growth rate, salary 
growth in dollar amount can be lower for women than for men.  So percentage salary 
change is the better measurement than dollar amount.  The variable percent change in 
salary is created by the formula: ((next year’s salary – this year’s salary) / this year’s 
salary) × 100.  The variable promotion is coded 1 if his or her next year grade is higher 
than this year grade and coded 0 for everyone else. 
 
Independent Variables 
Model for Performance-Evaluation Bias 
 The key independent variables are a set of race and gender groups.  OPM 
classifies employees into five racial groups: white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native 
American.  However, because the sample included so few Native Americans, I dropped 
them and created seven race and gender dummy variables: Black male, Hispanic male, 
Asian male, White female, Black female, Hispanic female, and Asian female.  The 
reference group is white male.  
 OPM categorizes occupational group and occupational series, which provide full 
structure of federal white collar occupations.  Occupational group is a major category, 
which embraces “a group of associated or related occupations,” and occupational series are 
“a subdivision of an occupational group or job family consisting of positions similar as to 
specialized line of work and qualification requirements” (U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, 2009).  Some occupational series are male-dominant and the gender 
composition of an occupation may affect performance rating distribution.  Based on the 
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OPM classification on occupational group and series, I create 9 dummy variables for the 
sex-type of the occupational series, from less than 10 percent male to 80 to 89 percent 
male in occupation.  The reference group is occupational series where 90 percent or 
higher are male.  
 Performance ratings vary greatly by grade and agency, implying that gender and 
racial differences in performance ratings can arise from the differences in their grade and 
the agency in which they work.  To control for grade, I create 14 dummy variables; one 
variable for each grade from grade 4 to 167 and grades 1 through 3 are combined due to 
small sample size.  I also create 21 agency dummy variables including all cabinet-level 
departments and four largest independent agencies in terms of the number of employees, 
which are Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Social Security Administration.  All the other 
agencies are combined as other agencies and used as the reference group. 
 Federal white-collar occupations are classified into five categories: Professional, 
Administrative, Technical, Clerical, and Other (PATCO).  Because the practice of 
personnel management varies with PATCO categories, I include four PATCO dummy 
variables, with Other as the reference group.  
 This study controls for individual characteristics.  The CPDF does not have 
information on evaluators’ characteristics such as race, gender, and age, which may affect 
evaluatees’ levels of performance ratings, so I include only evaluatee’s characteristics.  
The variable supervisory status is a dummy variable coded 1 for supervisor or manager 
                                               
 
 
7 The General Schedule has 15 grades, but for convenience, employees in the Senior Executive Service are 
coded as grade 16.  
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and 0 for everyone else.  Education is an interval level variable, measured in years.  
Federal experience and age are measured in years, and squared terms for both variables 
are included in the model to capture any curvilinear effects. 
 
Model for Performance-Reward Bias 
 Basically the models for testing performance-reward bias are same as the model 
for performance-evaluation bias.  To test performance-reward bias, which means women 
and minorities would receive lower returns on the same performance ratings, seven race 
and gender dummy variables are used: black male, Hispanic male, Asian male, white 
female, black female, Hispanic female, and Asian female.  I compare each of these race 
and gender groups with white male, the reference group, in salary change and promotion 
probability.  
 Some studies argue that there is occupational sex segregation and that “women’s 
work” pays worse (Catanzarite, 2003; Cohen & Huffman, 2003).  To examine whether 
occupational sex-type affects racial and gender differences in rewards, I include nine 
dummy variables from less than 10 percent male to 80-89 percent male in occupation.  
PATCO categories also are associated with male-female composition and pay level.  Less 
women than men work in Professional and Administrative occupations, although the gap 
has been decreasing in recent years, and Professional and Administrative occupations pay 
better than three other categories.  So, four dummy variables for PATCO categories are 
included in the model and Other category is used as the reference group.  
 An employee’s salary level is largely determined by his grade, but percent change 
of salary may differ among grade levels.  Promotion probability also drops with grade 
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levels.  I create a dummy variable grade 3 for those who are in grade 1, 2, or 3, and a set 
of dummy variables for each of every grade level from grade 4 to 16.  Each coefficient 
will be compares with grade 8, the reference group. 
 As Condrey and Brudney (1992) showed, the practice of performance-related pay 
varies with agencies.  I create dummy variables for all cabinet level departments and four 
independent agencies: Environmental Protection Agency, General Services 
Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Social Security 
Administration, agencies that employ the largest number of workers.  
 Individual characteristics are important factors in determining pay level and 
promotion probabilities.  Supervisory status is a dummy variable coded 1 for supervisors 
or managers and 0 for everyone else.  Education, federal experience, and age are all 
interval level variables and measured in years.  To capture curvilinear effect, I include 
squared terms for federal experience and age.  
 
Methods 
Models for Performance-Evaluation Bias 
 Since the dependent variable performance rating is an ordinal level variable, 
ordered logit is the appropriate model to test performance-evaluation bias.  Although 
performance rating has three values (1 for fully successful or lower, 2 for level between 
fully successful or lower and outstanding, and 3 for outstanding), the difference between 
1 and 2 is not same as the difference between 2 and 3.  Therefore, ordinary least square 
regression, which assumes a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables, is not appropriate for this study.  The multinomial logit analysis 
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can be used for discrete outcomes but has a weakness in that it cannot account for the 
ordinal nature of dependent variable.   
 The ordered logit model assumes the proportionality of odds, that is, the odds 
ratios are the same at all cut points.  For example, the first column (1988) in Table 22 
implies that the odds that a white woman will receive an outstanding rather than a lower 
rating is 1.5 times as high as the odds for a comparable white man and that the odds that 
she will receive an outstanding or exceeds fully successful rather than a lower rating is 1.5 
times as high as his odds.  Brant test results show that the ordered logit model for this 
study violates the proportionality of odds assumption.  However, because the sample size 
is so large that the Brant test can detect even minor violations of the assumption and most 
key independent variables are not statistically significant in most years, I use the ordered 
logit analysis.  
 To test the hypothesis that women and minorities received the same performance 
ratings as comparable men and whites, I run a set of cross-sectional ordered logit models 
by year from 1988 to 2003.  Because position and organizational characteristics may 
affect performance ratings so that gender and racial differences in performance ratings 
vary with those factors, I conduct additional analyses, which compare performance 
ratings among race and gender groups, by PATCO category and agency.  In order to 
conduct the additional analysis, it is necessary to have large enough sample sizes.  
Therefore, I combine 15 years of cross-sectional data and use pooled data analysis. To 
test the hypothesis that women and minorities received lower performance ratings than 
comparable men and whites when the positions were upper levels, I run ordered logit 
models by grade level.  To test whether women receive lower performance ratings than 
 74 
men in male-dominant occupations, I run another series of ordered logit analyses by sex-
type of occupation. 
 
Models for Performance-Rewards Bias 
 To test the possibility of performance-rewards bias, this study analyzes the impact 
of performance ratings on salary increases and on promotions separately.  First, I 
compare salary increases among each race and gender group in each of three performance 
ratings (fully successful and lower, exceeds fully successful, and outstanding), after 
controlling for individual and job-related characteristics.  This analysis, which is pooled 
OLS, will tell us whether the impact of higher ratings on salary increases is greater or 
smaller for women and minorities than for comparable white men.  In addition, analysis 
with interaction terms allows us whether the differences in the impact of the higher 
ratings on salary increases among race and gender groups are statistically significant.   
 This study test the hypothesis that the return on an outstanding rating is lower for 
women and minorities in upper-level positions and in male-dominant occupations .  
Using cross-sectional OLS by year, I examine whether women receive lower salary 
increases than men in male-dominant occupations.     
 Following the same process as in salary increases, this study first examines the 
impact of performance ratings on promotion probabilities by race and gender groups, and 
confirms whether the difference of the impact among groups are statistically significant 
using additional analysis with interaction terms.  Then, I check whether women and 
minorities have lower promotion probabilities than comparable men and whites when the 
positions are upper levels.  Finally, to test the hypotheses that women had lower 
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promotion probability than comparable men in male-dominant occupations, I restrict the 
sample to those who are under male-dominant occupations where over 70 percents are 
male employees.  
 
3.6 Findings 
Basic Patterns 
 Table 3.1 shows the differences in mean characteristics between white males and 
each of seven race and gender groups in the 1988-2003 period.  Numbers in the White 
males row represent the mean values for white males.  Thus, 30.9 percent of white men 
received outstanding ratings over this period, 12.8 percent received promotions, and their 
mean salary increase was 6.4 percent.  The differences of the values from white males are 
obtained using regression analysis and are mostly statistically significant.  Thus, black 
males were 4.5 percentage points less likely to receive outstanding ratings but 2.2 
percentage points more likely to be promoted, and their mean salary increase (6.7 
percent) was 0.3 percentage points larger than white males.  Interestingly, percentage of 
receiving outstanding ratings is lower for other male groups than for white men, but the 
percentage is higher for women (except for black women) than for white men.  Blacks 
and Hispanic men were about 4.5 percentage points less likely to receive outstanding 
ratings than white men, whereas white and Asian women were about 7.7 percentage 
points more likely to do so than white men.   
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Table 3.1: Differences in Mean Characteristics by Race and gender 
 
 % Out-  % Salary % Promo- Grade Education Federal  Age Supervisor Professional 
  standing Change     tion   experience   Administrative 
 
White malesa) 30.9 6.4 12.8 10.8 15.2 14.7 45.3 23.1 71.4 
 
Differs from white males for: 
Black males -4.5** 0.3** 2.2** -1.7** -1.0** -0.8** -0.6** -7.2** -19.2** 
Hispanic males -4.6** 0.6** 4.1** -1.1** -0.7** -2.3** -2.1** -6.9** -15.5** 
Asian males -0.9 0.1 1.6** -0.1 0.4** -2.5** 0.8** -8.3** 5.4** 
White females  7.8** 0.7** 5.0** -2.4** -1.3** -1.2** -1.2** -11.8** -25.3** 
Black females -0.9** 0.6** 5.8** -3.2** -1.8** -0.6** -3.8** -14.7** -37.7** 
Hispanic females  1.2 1.0** 9.0** -3.1** -1.7** -2.4** -4.1** -15.1** -34.1** 
Asian females 7.7** 0.7** 5.6** -2.6** -0.5** -3.4** -2.0** -15.0** -21.3** 
 
Observations 228,409 143,015 214,487 228,409 228,394 228,409 228,407 228,307 228,409 
 
a) Numbers in White males row represent mean values for white male in each column, and coefficients on other race and gender  
    groups show the differences of the values from white male 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Average salary increases and promotion rates were higher for other race and 
gender groups than for white men.  Except for Asian men, coefficients on two male race 
groups and all four female race groups are positive (ranging from 0.3 to 1.0 percentage 
points) and statistically significant.  Hispanic women’s salary increase rate was the 
highest, which was 1 percentage point higher than white men’s.  Likewise, all seven race 
and gender groups have higher average promotion rates than white men; the differences 
range from 1.6 (Asian men) to 9.0 (Hispanic women) percentage points.     
The mean grade is higher for white men than for other groups, however.  White 
men’s mean grade is 12.8, and six race and gender groups’ mean grades are 1.1 (Hispanic 
men) to 3.2 grades (black women) lower than white men’s.  In general, women’s mean 
grades are lower than men’s.   
The seven race and gender groups’ higher mean values on the three dependent 
variables but lower mean grades than white men might be related to their lower human 
capital levels.  They are 0.5 to 1.8 years less educated, 0.6 to 3.4 years less experienced, 
and 0.6 to 4.1 years younger than white men, except for Asian men, who are a bit more 
educated and older than white men.  In general, mean years of education and mean age 
are lower for women than for the three male minority groups.   
White men are more likely than other race and gender groups to be supervisors 
and to work in Professional and Administrative occupations.  The percentage of white 
men who are supervisors is 23 percent and other race and gender groups are 7 to 15 
percentage points less likely than white men to be supervisors.  Altogether, 75.5 percent 
of white men work in either Professional or Administrative categories, but black and 
Hispanic men are 19 and 15 percentage points less likely than white men to work in those 
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occupational categories.  Women are much less likely than white men and three other 
male minority groups to work in Professional and Administrative categories, with 
coefficients ranging from 21 to 38. 
 In sum, white men have lower average ratings, salary increases, and promotion 
rates than the other seven race and gender groups but higher mean grades, percentages 
who are supervisors, and percentages who work in Professional and Administrative.  The 
following analysis examine whether the patterns exist even after controlling for 
individual and job-related characteristics. 
 
Performance-Evaluation Bias 
 Table 3.2 reports the ordered logit results of the race and gender differences in 
performance ratings by year from 1988 to 2003.  The model includes individual and 
organizational factors (but these are not shown).  The reference group for the set of race 
and gender dummy variables is white men.  So, positive logit coefficients indicate that a 
group is more likely to receive higher ratings than white men, the reference group.   
 Asian and white women are the most likely and black men are the least likely to 
receive higher ratings.  Holding the other variables constant, white women’s log-odds of 
receiving outstanding ratings are 0.3 to 0.4 higher than the log-odds of white men over 
the period of 16 years.  The logit coefficients can be translated to expectations that white 
women were 6.8 percentage points more likely than white men to receive outstanding 
ratings and 8.6 percentage points less likely than white men to receive less than fully 
successful or lower ratings in 1988, holding the other variables at their means.  The 
differences between white women and men in receiving outstanding ratings do not 
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change much over time.  White women were 6.8 percentage points more likely to get 
outstanding ratings in 1988 and 6.6 percentage points more likely to do so in 2002.  Asian 
women were 6.9 and 14.9 percentage points more likely to receive outstanding ratings 
than white men in 1988 and in 2002, respectively, when the other variables have mean 
characteristics.  On the other hand, black men’s log-odds of receiving outstanding ratings 
are 0.19 to 0.29 lower than white men’s log-odds.  Other groups are not different from 
white men in receiving higher performance ratings.  Therefore, the results do not support 
Hypothesis 2.1, which hypothesized that women and minorities received the same 
performance ratings as comparable white men.  Although average performance ratings 
have increased over time, difference in receiving outstanding ratings among race and 
gender groups do not vary much with time. 
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Table 3.2: Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings by Year: Ordered Logit Model 
 
        
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  
 
White females 0.405** 0.358** 0.389** 0.319** 0.419** 0.380** 0.367** 0.356** 
 (7.25) (6.63) (7.40) (6.16) (8.21) (7.51) (7.15) (6.84)  
 
Black females 0.026 -0.089 -0.080 -0.042 -0.054 0.056 -0.017 0.019  
 (0.35) (1.21) (1.12) (0.60) (0.78) (0.81) (0.25) (0.27)  
 
Hispanic females -0.309* -0.071 0.208 0.094 0.238 0.045 0.110 0.027  
 (1.98) (0.48) (1.49) (0.67) (1.77) (0.34) (0.83) (0.20)  
 
Asian females 0.384* 0.561** 0.138 -0.028 0.263 0.177 0.110 0.203  
 (2.13) (3.25) (0.84) (0.18) (1.67) (1.14) (0.71) (1.34)  
 
 
Black males -0.185* -0.221* -0.256** -0.289** -0.206* -0.244** -0.224** -0.230**  
 (2.03) (2.51) (2.98) (3.43) (2.52) (2.96) (2.72) (2.73)  
 
Hispanic males  -0.214 -0.096 -0.055 -0.290* -0.235 -0.095 -0.181 -0.194  
 (1.53) (0.74) (0.43) (2.28) (1.92) (0.79) (1.52) (1.66)  
 
Asian males 0.218 0.097 0.032 0.099 0.139 0.093 0.121 0.131  
 (1.33) (0.62) (0.22) (0.68) (1.00) (0.68) (0.89) (0.95)  
 
Observations 10197 10719 11038 11194 11519 11559 11321 11071 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
White females 0.382** 0.364** 0.331** 0.368** 0.391** 0.421** 0.281** 0.396** 
 (7.04) (6.62) (5.57) (5.16) (5.19) (5.22) (3.14) (4.48) 
 
Black females  -0.017 0.050 0.053 0.029 0.109 0.027 -0.149 -0.034 
  (0.23) (0.70) (0.68) (0.31) (1.13) (0.27) (1.34) (0.31) 
 
Hispanic females  0.140 0.323* 0.267 0.303 0.522** 0.430* -0.187 -0.042 
 (1.08) (2.41) (1.88) (1.81) (3.00) (2.32) (0.95) (0.23) 
 
Asian females 0.539** 0.519** 0.482** 0.314 0.438* 0.713** 0.639* 0.608* 
 (3.41) (3.25) (2.85) (1.61) (2.09) (3.02) (2.44) (2.40) 
 
 
Black males -0.260** -0.168 -0.192* -0.256* -0.295* -0.219 -0.229 -0.293* 
 (2.96) (1.92) (2.07) (2.33) (2.51) (1.71) (1.62) (2.16) 
 
Hispanic males -0.160 -0.032 0.125 -0.015 0.060 0.019 0.001 -0.030 
 (1.29) (0.26) (0.91) (0.10) (0.37) (0.11) (0.01) (0.17) 
 
Asian males 0.077 0.040 -0.008 -0.044 -0.000 0.041 -0.029 0.034 
 (0.52) (0.26) (0.05) (0.24) (0.00) (0.19) (0.12) (0.14) 
 
Observations 10282 9958 8906 6563 5959 5591 4732 5099 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses         
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1
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 Table A.18 shows the ordered logit results for performance evaluation bias by 
PATCO category.  The patterns of gender and racial differences in performance ratings 
vary a bit among PATCO categories.  In Professional occupations, black men and women 
are expected to receive lower ratings than comparable white men, whereas white women 
tend to receive higher ratings than comparable white men.  Three race and gender groups 
(white women, Asian women, and Asian men) are more likely than comparable white 
men to receive higher ratings in Administrative occupations.  Interestingly, all four 
female groups are expected to receive higher performance ratings than white men, 
whereas two male groups, black and Hispanic, are expected to receive lower ratings than 
white men in Technical occupations.  In the Other category, performance ratings do not 
differ among gender and racial groups, except that Hispanic men are less likely than 
white men to receive higher ratings.   
In all PATCO categories except Other, white women receive higher ratings than 
comparable white men but black men receive lower ratings than comparable white men.   
Asian women also are more likely than white men to receive higher ratings in 
Administrative, Technical, and Clerical occupations.  The results again reject the 
Hypothesis 2.1 that women and minorities received the same performance ratings as 
comparable white men.       
As shown in Table A.19, differences in performance ratings among gender and 
racial groups vary across federal agencies.  For example, while all four female groups 
were expected to receive higher ratings than comparable white men in the Army, no 
female group received higher ratings than white men in the Social Security 
Administration and NASA.  In general, female groups tend to receive higher ratings but 
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minority male groups tend to receive lower ratings than comparable white men.  White 
women receive higher ratings than white men in 17 of 24 agencies.  Holding the other 
variables at their means, white women are 16.2 and 5.8 percentage points more likely 
than white men to receive outstanding ratings in the Labor and Health and Human 
Services, respectively.  Asian women and Hispanic women are expected to receive higher 
ratings than comparable white men in 9 and 7 of 24 agencies, respectively.  However, 
black women receive higher ratings only in three agencies but receive lower ratings in 
four agencies.  
On the contrary, minority male groups, particularly black men, consistently 
receive lower performance ratings.  While black men do not receive higher ratings than 
comparable white men in any federal agency, they receive significantly lower ratings 
than white men in half of the federal agencies.  In particular, black men are 44.2 and 17.0 
percentage points more likely to receive fully successful or lower ratings than white men 
in the EPA and NASA, respectively, holding the other variables at their means.   
Table A.20 shows the ordered logit results that test Hypothesis 2.2, that women 
and minorities received lower performance ratings than comparable men and whites in 
upper-level positions.  There is no clear tendency that as grade level increases women 
and minorities’ probability of receiving higher ratings would decrease.  However, all four 
female groups receive higher ratings than comparable white men in grade 5 through 7, 
whereas only white women receive higher ratings in grades 4, 14, and 16.  No minority 
male group receives lower ratings than white men until grade 6, but above grade 6, black 
and Hispanic males receive lower ratings than white males in 6 and 4 grade levels, 
respectively.       
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As shown in Table A.21, there is also no clear evidence that female groups 
receive lower ratings than comparable white men in male-dominant occupations.  White 
and Asian women are 9.6 and 3.7 percentage points more likely to receive outstanding 
ratings than white men when 71 to 80 percent of workers in an occupation are mean, 
holding the other variables at their means.  White women are expected to receive higher 
ratings than white men even when the occupations are 91 percent or above men.  On the 
other hand, female-dominant occupations do not guarantee that women could receive the 
same performance ratings as comparable men.  In female-dominant occupations, where 
over 90 percent are women, black women are 7.0 percentage points less likely to receive 
outstanding ratings than white men and other three female groups do not differ in 
receiving outstanding ratings from white men, when the other variables have mean 
characteristics.   Therefore, the results do not support the Hypothesis 2.3 that women 
received lower performance ratings than comparable men in male-dominant occupations.  
Regardless of male-female composition in the occupations, black men and Hispanic men 
receive lower ratings than comparable white men. 
 
Performance-Rewards Bias 
 Table 3.3 shows pooled OLS results of the impact of performance ratings on 
percent change in salary increases for eight race and gender groups.  The reference group 
is those who received fully successful or lower ratings, so the coefficients on outstanding 
and exceeds fully successful show the percentage difference in salary increases from those 
who received the three lowest ratings.  Among white males, outstanding performers tend 
to receive 0.3 percentage points bigger pay increases than fully successful or lower 
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performers, holding the other variables constant.  Unexpectedly, the impact of 
outstanding ratings on salary increase is greater for female groups than for white men.  
Compared to fully successful or lower performers, outstanding performers’ salary 
increases are 1.3, 0.9, and 0.5 percentage points larger for Hispanic, Asian, and black 
females, respectively.  White women who received outstanding ratings tend to receive 0.4 
percentage points more salary increases than comparable white women who received 
fully successful or lower ratings.  While salary increases are 0.5 percentage points higher 
for outstanding performers than for fully successful or lower performers for black males, 
there is no significant difference in salary increase rate between those who received 
outstanding and those who received the three lowest ratings among Hispanic men and 
among Asian men.   
 Are the differences in the impact of outstanding ratings on salary increases 
between white men and other groups significant?  The results of the OLS model with 
interaction terms show that outstanding ratings give an additional 1.0 and 0.6 percentage 
points salary increase for Hispanic women and Asian women than for white men.  The 
impact of outstanding ratings is 0.2 percentage points larger for black women than for 
white men.  The coefficients for other groups are not statistically significant, indicating 
the advantages of outstanding ratings over fully successful or lower ratings in salary 
increases do not differ significantly between white men and other four groups.  Thus, the 
results reject the Hypothesis 2.4, that higher performance ratings increase salaries by 
similar amounts for men and women and for whites and minorities.    
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Table 3.3: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth: Pooled OLS Model 
 
 
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males males males 
 
Outstanding 0.283** 0.415** 0.480** B 1.289** A 0.884** B 0.471** 0.347 0.111 
 (6.15) (7.16) (5.36) (5.66) (3.13) (3.50) (1.54) (0.42) 
 
Exceeds fully  -0.012 0.064 0.206* B 0.590** A 0.215 0.013 0.087 -0.125 
successful (0.29) (1.13) (2.53) (2.76) (0.78) (0.11) (0.45) (0.54) 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
A: Differences in coefficients between white male and other groups are statistically significant at .01 level, B: significant at .05 level 
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 The coefficients on exceeds fully successful are positive and significant for black 
and Hispanic women.  Holding the other variables constant, those who receive exceeds 
fully successful ratings tend to receive 0.6 and 0.2 percentage points more salary increase 
than those who received fully successful or lower ratings among Hispanic and black 
women, respectively.   
 As shown in Table A.22, the patterns are a bit different in the upper grades (grade 
14 or above).  Outstanding ratings have significant impact on salary increases only for 
white men and black men.  Holding the other variables constant, white men who received 
outstanding ratings are 0.4 percentage points bigger salary increases than white men who 
received fully successful or lower ratings.  Among black men, the salary increase is 0.4 
percentage points bigger for outstanding performers than for fully successful or lower 
performers.  The other six groups, on the other hand, do not have advantages in salary 
increases when they received outstanding ratings rather than fully successful or lower 
ratings.  Exceeds fully successful ratings do not have impact on salary increases in any of 
the eight groups.  Therefore, the results partially support the Hypothesis 2.5, that higher 
performance ratings had lower salary increases for women and minorities than for men 
and whites when the positions are upper levels. 
 In the lower level grades (grade 5 or below), receiving outstanding ratings rather 
than fully successful or lower ratings have advantages in salary increases for three female 
groups and white men.  Outstanding performers receive 1.2 percentage points, 0.5 
percentage points, and 0.3 percentage points more salary increases than fully successful 
or lower performers, among Hispanic women, black women, and white women, 
respectively.  While outstanding ratings do not have an impact on salary increases for the 
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other three male groups, outstanding performers receive 0.6 percentage points higher 
salary increases than fully successful performers among white men.  In other words, 
white men have advantages in salary increases when they receive outstanding ratings 
either in the upper level positions or lower grade levels.  For Hispanic women and black 
women, even exceeds fully successful performers receive higher salary increase than 
fully successful or lower performers when they in the lower level grades.    
 Table A.23 presents the OLS results that test the Hypothesis 2.6, that higher 
performance ratings increased salaries less for women than men in male-dominant 
occupations.  The results do not support the hypothesis; however, women may have had 
disadvantages in male-dominant occupations but advantages in female-dominant 
occupations.  Among female groups, outstanding ratings had a significant impact on 
salary increases only for white women in male-dominant occupations, but for Hispanics, 
blacks, and whites in female-dominant occupations.  On the other hand, outstanding 
performers receive higher salary increases than fully successful performers among white 
men and among black men in male-dominant occupations, but only white men receive 
higher salary increases when they receive outstanding ratings rather than fully successful 
ratings in female-dominant occupations.  However, differences in the impact of 
outstanding ratings on salary increases among race and gender groups are not statistically 
significant. 
 Table 3.4 shows the results of pooled logit analysis on the impact of performance 
ratings on promotion.  Outstanding ratings have a substantial impact on promotions in 
most groups (except for Asian males).  Coefficients on outstanding are largest for 
Hispanic women and smallest for white men.  Outstanding performers are 12.9 and 4.6 
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Table 3.4: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion: Pooled Logit Model 
 
 
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males  males males 
 
Outstanding 0.449** 0.372** 0.424** 0.937** A 0.596** 0.482** 0.584** 0.051 
 (11.45) (10.02) (7.29) (6.60) (3.27) (5.00) (3.75) (0.24) 
 
Exceeds fully 0.131** 0.122** 0.238** 0.456** B 0.102 0.169* 0.292* 0.047 
Successful (3.73) (3.41) (4.53) (3.46) (0.57) (2.00) (2.20) (0.26) 
 
Observations 59,913 44,364 17,465 3,062 2,171 7,948 3,349 2,323 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics        
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
A: Differences in coefficients between white male and other groups are statistically significant at .01 level, B: significant at .05 level 
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percentage points more likely to be promoted than fully successful performers among 
Hispanic women and white women, respectively, holding the other variables at their 
means.  Exceeds fully successful performers also have higher promotion chances than 
those who received the three lowest ratings in six groups.  The outstanding coefficient is 
larger for Hispanic men and women, Asian women, and black men than for white men, 
but the difference is statistically significant only for Hispanic women.  Although 
coefficients on exceeds fully successful vary among race and gender groups, the 
difference is significant only between white men and Hispanic women.  Therefore, the 
impact of higher performance ratings on promotions does not differ between white men 
and other six race and gender groups, which partially supports the Hypothesis 2.7, that 
higher performance ratings increased promotion probabilities by the same amount for 
men and women and for whites and minorities. 
 As shown in Table A.24, outstanding ratings have significant impact on 
promotion only for black men and white men in the upper levels.  Holding the other 
variables at their mean, those who received outstanding ratings are 6.5 and 3.6 percentage 
points more likely to receive promotions than those who received the three lowest ratings 
among black men and white men, respectively.  In the upper levels, even exceeds fully 
successful ratings have advantage over fully successful or lower ratings in promotion 
among white men.  Therefore, the results partially support the Hypothesis 2.8, which 
hypothesized that higher performance ratings increased promotion probabilities less for 
women and minorities than for men and whites in upper-level positions. 
 The patterns are quite different in the lower grades.  Outstanding ratings give a 
higher chance of promotion than fully successful or lower ratings for three female groups 
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(Hispanic, black, and white) as well as for white men and Hispanic men.  Although 
coefficients on outstanding are greater for Hispanic women and men than for white men, 
the differences are not statistically significant, indicating the impact of outstanding 
ratings does not differ among race and gender groups.    
 Table A.25 shows the results of logit analysis, which tested Hypothesis 2.9, that 
higher performance ratings increased promotion probabilities less for women than men in 
male-dominant occupations.  Both outstanding ratings and exceeds fully successful 
ratings have significant impact on promotion probabilities for three male groups but for 
only one female group, which is white women, in male-dominant occupations.  On the 
contrary, outstanding performers have higher promotion probabilities than fully 
successful or lower performers for three female groups (Hispanic, black, and white) but 
for only one male group, white men, in female-dominant occupations.  In addition, 
compared to the lowest three ratings, exceeds fully successful ratings have advantages in 
promotion among Hispanic women and among black women in female-dominant 
occupations.  Although differences in the impact of higher ratings on promotion among 
race and gender groups are not statistically significant, which do not support the 
Hypothesis 2.9, most women groups seem to have disadvantages in promotion with the 
same higher ratings as comparable men in highly male-dominant occupations. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
This study examined whether performance appraisals contribute to race and 
gender inequalities in career success.  To understand whether discrimination occurs in the 
evaluation process or reward process, this study tested both possibilities separately.  First, 
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women receive equal or higher performance ratings than comparable white men.  
Women, particularly white and Asian women, are most likely to receive higher 
performance ratings, after controlling for individual and job-related characteristics.  On 
the other hand, some minority male groups, particularly black men, tend to receive lower 
ratings than comparable white men.  However, the patterns vary with PATCO category, 
agency, and grade level.  For example, black women are expected to receive lower 
ratings than comparable white men in Professional occupations, but they tend to receive 
higher ratings than white men in Technical occupations.  Black and Hispanic men are 
equally likely to receive higher ratings as comparable white men until grade 6, but they 
are expected to receive lower ratings in many grade categories than white men in grade 7-
16.  Second, the returns on outstanding ratings do not differ between women and minority 
male groups and white men.  Rather, outstanding ratings give additional salary increases 
for Hispanic, Asian and black women than for comparable white men.  The impact of 
outstanding ratings on promotion probabilities is greater for Hispanic women than for 
white men.  But women groups seem to have disadvantages in salary increases and 
promotion with the same higher ratings as comparable men in upper-level positions and 
highly male-dominant occupations. 
 This study suggests that performance appraisals do not contribute to the 
disadvantages of women and minorities in career success.  In fact, performance ratings 
may have weak impact on salary increases and promotion probabilities. When I didn’t 
control for performance ratings and compared salary increases and promotion 
probabilities among race and gender groups, the results did not much differ from the 
models which controlled for performance ratings.  The managerial tools, performance 
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appraisals, do not seem to be related to gender and racial inequality in career success in 
the federal civil service. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 
For performance-based rewards to be successful, there should be a clear link 
between performance ratings and rewards, and a meaningful difference in rewards 
between good and poor performers.  Although many observers attribute the 
ineffectiveness of performance-based rewards in the public sector to the weak link 
between performance and rewards, little is known about the strength of the linkage.  This 
dissertation attempts to provide empirical evidence on the impact of performance ratings 
on personnel decisions in two essays.   
The first essay finds that performance ratings have only a limited impact on salary 
increases.  Those who received outstanding ratings are expected to receive higher salary 
increases than those who received fully successful ratings only in Technical occupations, 
in five of 14 grades, and in the Commerce Department.  In addition, the size of the impact 
on salary increases is very small.  This study measured the impact of performance ratings 
on salary increases separately by year, PATCO category, grade level, and agency, but 
even when coefficients were significant, salary increases differed by only 0.2 to 1.4 
percentage points between those who received outstanding ratings and comparable 
employees those who received fully successful ratings.  The impact of exceeds fully 
successful, the second highest rating in the federal civil service, on salary increases is also 
minimal. Coefficients on fully successful are not significant any of PATCO category, and 
are significant only 2 of 15 years and in 3 of 14 grade groups.   
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The impact of outstanding ratings on promotion probabilities is larger.  Promotion 
probabilities are significantly higher for those who received outstanding ratings than for 
comparable employees who received fully successful ratings in 11 of 15 years and in all 
PATCO categories.  The results imply that federal agencies use performance appraisal 
results more seriously for promotion decisions than for salary increase decisions.  
However, the strength of the linkage between performance ratings and promotion varies 
among grade levels and agencies.  While outstanding ratings have significant impact on 
promotion probability in some low (GS 4 and GS 5) and middle grades (GS 9, 11, 12), 
promotion probabilities do not differ between outstanding performers and fully successful 
performers in other grade level groups.  Also, outstanding ratings are valuable for 
promotion in some agencies such as Army, Air Force, and Treasury.    
To examine whether performance appraisals contribute to gender and racial 
inequalities in career success, the second essay tested performance evaluation bias and 
performance reward bias separately.  The study finds that women receive equal or higher 
performance ratings than comparable white men.  In particular, white women receive 
consistently higher ratings than white men, after controlling for individual and job-related 
characteristics.  However, some minority male groups, particularly black men, tend to 
receive lower ratings than comparable white men.  On the other hand, the returns on 
outstanding ratings do not differ between minority male groups and white men.  
Outstanding ratings increase salaries and chances of promotion more for some female 
groups.      
This study provides some important policy implications.  First, the federal 
government needs to strengthen the linkage between performance ratings and rewards, if 
 
 
96 
performance-based rewards to be effective.  Although many observers pointed out that 
rewards for top performers are not much greater than average performers, they didn’t 
provide evidence in a quantifiable manner.  This study demonstrates that even the highest 
performance ratings, outstanding ratings, do not have a significant advantage in career 
advancement over middle level ratings, fully successful ratings, in the federal civil 
service.  Therefore, if agencies want to have effective performance-based reward systems, 
they should provide top performers with “meaningfully” different rewards, so that 
employees perceive a stronger linkage between performance ratings and rewards.  
Second, although the overall impact of performance appraisal ratings on career 
advancement seems to be weak, outstanding ratings clearly give higher chances of 
promotion to the employees in the federal civil service.  In other words, despite rating 
inflation in the federal government, performance appraisals still serve for personnel 
decisions.  Thus, the argument that federal performance appraisal is useless (Light, 1999) 
is not true.  Half of federal agencies moved from traditional five level ratings to pass or 
fail systems (Henry, 2009), but the pass or fail system is not an effective tool to serve 
personnel decisions (Liff, 2007; Montoya & Graham, 2007).  Instead of giving up an 
important purpose of performance appraisals, judgmental purposes, federal agencies need 
to improve their performance appraisal systems to become a helpful tool to make 
personnel decisions. 
Lastly, this study provides useful insights for reducing gender inequalities in 
career success.  Disadvantages of women in career success are not associated with 
performance appraisals, which is a key managerial tool for human resource management.  
Rather, performance ratings for women are as high as or higher than those for white men.  
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In addition, once women receive the same outstanding ratings as comparable white men, 
they are equally likely to receive salary increases and promotion.  Therefore, if agencies 
strongly use performance appraisal results for their personnel decisions, differences in 
career success between men and women would be reduced.     
By providing empirical evidence on the impact of performance ratings on 
personnel decisions, this study expands our understanding of performance appraisals and 
performance-based rewards in the federal civil service.  However, this study does not 
reflect a dramatic change of federal performance appraisals and performance-based 
rewards system in recent years, because the most recent data used for this study is 2003. 
Therefore, future study should use more recent data which includes new pay-for-
performance systems in Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.  
Performance-based rewards are not unique in the federal government but are used 
in many state and local governments.  However, the findings of this study may not be 
generalizable to the other levels of governments.  In order to understand the relationship 
between performance ratings and rewards in the public sector in general, future research 
needs to analyze data for state and local governments. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLES 
 
Table A.1: Performance Appraisal Rating Distribution, 1988-2003 (In Percentage) 
Rating 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
5 21.9 22.9 24.6 27.5 29.5 31.0 33.7 38.1 41.3 41.9 41.8 49.6 45.4 43.8 42.6 44.0 
4 38.0 38.6 39.9 42.6 42.8 43.0 42.7 40.7 38.0 36.7 31.8 32.8 29.2 27.1 25.4 25.8 
3 39.3 37.9 35.0 29.4 27.4 25.7 23.2 20.8 20.2 21.0 26.1 17.3 25.2 28.7 31.6 29.8 
2 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Mean 3.81 3.84 3.89 3.97 4.01 4.05 4.10 4.17 4.20 4.20 4.15 4.31 4.20 4.14 4.10 4.13 
N 11,964 12,284 12,593 12,527 12,954 13,110 12,982 12,501 12,151 11,210 10,105 7,486 6,711 6,330 5,669 5,146 
 
Due to the fact that a substantial number of federal employees have gone to rating systems other than five rating levels but this study 
restricted sample to those under five-level ratings, the sample size is decreased since 1996.   
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Table A.2: Career Advancement by Year  
 
 
 Mean 
Performance 
Rating 
% 
Outstanding 
Mean 
%  Change 
in Salary 
% 
Promoted 
Sample  
Size 
1988 3.8 21.4 8.4 21.4 11,194 
1989 3.8 23.0 7.5 19.2 11,537 
1990 3.9 24.6 8.7 17.9 11,877 
1991 4.0 27.5 7.8 17.1 12,024 
1992 4.0 29.5 6.8 14.0 12,472 
1993 4.0 30.9 6.1 13.5 12,496 
1994 4.1 33.9 5.6 12.6 12,247 
1995 4.2 38.3 5.2 12.7 11,902 
1996 4.2 41.3 5.7 12.1 11,277 
1997 4.2 41.8 5.4 12.2 10,707 
1998 4.2 41.9 6.2 12.9 9,596 
1999 4.3 49.6 7.4 13.1 7,093 
2000 4.2 45.7 6.7 13.8 6,396 
2001 4.1 44.0 7.5 14.1 6,004 
2002 4.1 43.0 6.9 14.6 5,238 
2003 4.1 44.0 N/A N/A 5,146 
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Table A.3: T-test by Year: Career Advancement Comparison  
between Fully Successful and Outstanding 
 
 
 Mean % salary change %  promoted 
 Fully 
successful Outstanding 
Fully 
successful Outstanding 
1988 8.5** 7.8 21.7** 18.5 
1989 7.9** 7.5 19.4 20.2 
1990 8.9* 8.6 17.1 18.4 
1991 7.8 7.8 16.4 17.7 
1992 7.0 6.8 13.9 14.0 
1993 6.2 6.0 15.9** 12.3 
1994 5.7 5.6 12.2 13.8 
1995 5.1 5.3 11.5 14.1** 
1996 5.6 5.8 11.5 13.3* 
1997 5.5 5.4 12.3 12.4 
1998 6.2 6.2 12.0 13.3 
1999 7.5 7.4 13.4 13.2 
2000 6.6 6.7 13.9 13.7 
2001 7.3 7.6* 13.5 14.2 
2002 6.9 6.9 15.0 14.6 
 
* significant at .05; ** significant at .01 
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Table A.4: Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth by Year : OLS Model 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
Outstanding 0.227 0.396** 0.245 0.609** 0.402** 0.185 0.467** 0.578** 0.538** 0.254* 0.406** 0.445** 0.219 0.170 -0.107 
 (1.69) (3.07) (1.77) (5.22) (3.80) (1.67) (4.41) (5.50) (5.00) (2.33) (3.58) (2.94) (1.25) (0.94) (0.54) 
Exceeds fully -0.154 0.003 0.086 0.254* 0.071 0.076 0.145 0.297** 0.105 0.027 0.031 0.075 0.111 -0.181 -0.338 
 (1.37) (0.03) (0.73) (2.50) (0.76) (0.77) (1.49) (2.99) (1.03) (0.25) (0.27) (0.50) (0.63) (0.98) (1.67) 
Less than fully -1.168 -1.092 -0.212 -0.221 -0.861 -1.140 -0.410 -0.661 -0.853 -0.434 -0.004 0.704 0.948 -0.055 1.929 
 (1.73) (1.69) (0.25) (0.39) (1.27) (1.73) (0.66) (1.09) (1.52) (0.73) (0.01) (0.71) (0.81) (0.06) (1.93) 
 
Black males  -0.205 -0.008 0.538* -0.235 0.131 -0.004 0.243 0.180 0.145 0.286 0.423* 0.292 -0.486 0.322 -0.165 
 (0.92) (0.04) (2.38) (1.24) (0.78) (0.02) (1.49) (1.12) (0.90) (1.75) (2.48) (1.37) (1.93) (1.31) (0.65) 
Hispanic males 0.258 0.709* 0.600 0.479 0.328 -0.001 0.298 -0.175 -0.492* 0.010 -0.147 0.008 0.375 0.300 0.522 
 (0.75) (2.19) (1.71) (1.66) (1.30) (0.00) (1.26) (0.76) (2.10) (0.04) (0.58) (0.03) (1.08) (0.87) (1.52) 
Asian males -0.524 -0.809* 0.445 0.567 -0.437 -1.430** -0.191 0.187 -0.142 -0.639* 0.292 -0.083 0.187 0.138 -1.223** 
 (1.24) (2.04) (1.09) (1.69) (1.46) (4.75) (0.68) (0.68) (0.50) (2.16) (0.93) (0.23) (0.46) (0.36) (3.07) 
White females  0.476** 0.569** 0.432** 0.358** 0.327** 0.587** 0.404** 0.321** 0.210* 0.249** 0.359** 0.319** 0.288 0.590** 0.528** 
 (3.64) (4.59) (3.25) (3.25) (3.33) (5.81) (4.24) (3.45) (2.25) (2.60) (3.57) (2.58) (1.95) (4.12) (3.54) 
Black females  -0.011 0.344* 0.518** 0.175 0.063 -0.020 -0.199 -0.053 0.117 0.209 0.504** 0.412* 0.375 0.646** 0.418* 
 (0.06) (2.00) (2.80) (1.14) (0.46) (0.14) (1.52) (0.42) (0.91) (1.60) (3.68) (2.44) (1.89) (3.36) (2.12) 
Hispanic females  0.039 0.478 0.801* 0.540 0.221 0.747** 0.158 0.335 0.415 0.173 0.849** 0.075 0.121 0.925* 1.267** 
 (0.11) (1.35) (2.15) (1.73) (0.80) (2.70) (0.61) (1.31) (1.75) (0.71) (3.32) (0.24) (0.33) (2.54) (3.49) 
Asian females  0.318 0.022 1.195** 0.325 0.015 -1.234** -0.240 -0.038 -0.326 0.269 0.500 0.012 0.720 0.419 0.460 
 (0.70) (0.05) (2.71) (0.87) (0.05) (3.74) (0.79) (0.13) (1.16) (0.94) (1.71) (0.03) (1.71) (1.04) (1.15) 
 
Education (year) 0.016 0.008 0.028 0.001 0.068** 0.034 -0.001 -0.001 -0.017 0.006 0.012 0.011 -0.007 -0.042 -0.003 
 (0.52) (0.28) (0.88) (0.05) (2.91) (1.40) (0.04) (0.04) (0.76) (0.27) (0.49) (0.36) (0.19) (1.23) (0.07) 
Years of service -0.438** -0.463** -0.427** -0.386** -0.335** -0.272** -0.302** -0.274** -0.285** -0.313** -0.287** -0.370** -0.316** -0.327** -0.424** 
 (19.67) (21.61) (18.50) (19.87) (19.29) (14.64) (16.50) (14.70) (14.75) (15.66) (13.59) (14.59) (10.74) (11.81) (15.26) 
Years of service 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.007** 0.005** 0.006** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006** 0.005** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 0.008** 
squared  (14.72) (15.98) (13.69) (14.58) (14.14) (10.51) (12.21) (10.55) (11.14) (11.91) (9.80) (11.11) (7.82) (8.32) (11.76) 
Age (year) -0.246** -0.205** -0.338** -0.262** -0.238** -0.144** -0.284** -0.201** -0.264** -0.264** -0.198** -0.312** -0.216** -0.235** -0.362** 
 (6.32) (5.41) (8.26) (7.66) (7.74) (4.46) (9.01) (6.38) (7.91) (7.51) (5.22) (6.68) (3.92) (4.32) (6.48) 
Age squared 0.002** 0.001** 0.003** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001* 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 0.003** 0.001* 0.002** 0.003** 
 (4.27) (3.41) (6.71) (5.57) (5.63) (2.48) (6.87) (4.47) (5.96) (5.54) (3.56) (5.35) (2.54) (3.13) (5.16) 
Supervisor 0.448** 0.515** 0.357* 0.353** 0.456** 0.331** -0.019 0.572** 0.281* 0.277* 0.270* 0.448** -0.001 0.437** 0.123 
 (3.13) (3.72) (2.37) (2.81) (4.02) (2.81) (0.17) (5.16) (2.49) (2.37) (2.16) (3.05) (0.01) (2.61) (0.70) 
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Table A.4 Continued 
 
GS 1-3 1.993** 1.325** 1.296* 0.379 0.966* 1.385** 0.089 0.354 0.666 0.064 0.406 -0.053 -1.071 -0.028 -1.707 
 (4.06) (2.72) (2.31) (0.77) (2.19) (2.91) (0.20) (0.78) (1.45) (0.13) (0.74) (0.07) (1.17) (0.03) (1.63) 
GS 4 1.195** 0.348 0.172 0.211 0.082 0.495 -0.027 0.429 0.369 0.476 -0.558 -0.062 -0.818 0.519 -0.017 
 (3.12) (0.97) (0.43) (0.64) (0.28) (1.57) (0.09) (1.53) (1.32) (1.63) (1.83) (0.16) (1.74) (1.12) (0.04) 
GS 5 1.415** 0.641 0.440 0.240 0.321 0.189 0.091 0.229 0.056 0.121 0.150 0.150 -0.396 0.448 0.154 
 (3.97) (1.95) (1.20) (0.80) (1.20) (0.66) (0.36) (0.95) (0.24) (0.50) (0.60) (0.48) (1.04) (1.21) (0.42) 
GS 6 1.011** 0.458 0.551 0.005 0.224 -0.076 0.043 0.478* 0.558* 0.398 0.162 0.742* -0.302 1.075** 0.532 
 (2.75) (1.36) (1.48) (0.02) (0.83) (0.27) (0.17) (1.98) (2.36) (1.64) (0.66) (2.46) (0.81) (2.97) (1.48) 
GS 7 2.149** 1.553** 1.248** 0.770** 0.606* 0.919** 0.721** 0.576* 0.736** 0.649** 0.711** 0.042 0.164 0.189 0.588 
 (6.13) (4.84) (3.48) (2.64) (2.33) (3.32) (2.99) (2.49) (3.25) (2.84) (3.05) (0.15) (0.49) (0.58) (1.84) 
GS 9 0.827* 0.400 0.025 0.129 -0.244 0.510 0.235 0.065 0.043 0.584* 0.261 0.292 0.447 0.899** 1.091** 
 (2.32) (1.22) (0.07) (0.43) (0.91) (1.78) (0.92) (0.27) (0.18) (2.41) (1.06) (0.99) (1.25) (2.60) (3.19) 
GS 10 -1.560** -1.608** -1.274** -1.802** -2.110** 0.246 -0.442 0.124 -0.258 -0.401 -0.350 -0.302 -0.743 -0.061 0.544 
 (3.36) (3.62) (2.67) (4.49) (6.00) (0.67) (1.16) (0.33) (0.68) (1.02) (0.89) (0.58) (1.25) (0.10) (0.87) 
GS 11 -1.185** -1.237** -1.405** -1.108** -1.141** -0.769** -0.890** -0.673** -0.563* -0.632* -0.304 0.002 -0.336 0.471 0.121 
 (3.26) (3.72) (3.79) (3.66) (4.21) (2.62) (3.44) (2.69) (2.28) (2.52) (1.19) (0.01) (0.91) (1.32) (0.34) 
GS 12 -1.902** -2.225** -2.048** -2.213** -2.051** -2.013** -1.635** -1.455** -1.423** -1.269** -0.890** -1.130** -1.367** -0.058 -0.757* 
 (5.18) (6.58) (5.45) (7.21) (7.47) (6.79) (6.21) (5.70) (5.66) (4.97) (3.39) (3.64) (3.65) (0.16) (2.09) 
GS 13 -1.992** -2.512** -2.517** -2.231** -2.230** -1.466** -2.109** -1.805** -1.553** -1.713** -1.143** -1.393** -1.782** -0.773* -0.957* 
 (5.10) (6.98) (6.34) (6.86) (7.68) (4.69) (7.54) (6.67) (5.82) (6.33) (4.11) (4.26) (4.55) (2.03) (2.53) 
GS 14 -2.441** -2.865** -2.899** -2.453** -2.457** -1.437** -2.218** -1.978** -1.516** -1.602** -1.140** -1.570** -1.445** -0.784 -0.585 
 (5.75) (7.30) (6.73) (6.96) (7.80) (4.27) (7.27) (6.69) (5.08) (5.32) (3.66) (4.26) (3.27) (1.80) (1.34) 
GS 15 -2.599** -3.237** -2.986** -2.955** -2.631** -1.567** -2.537** -2.607** -1.846** -2.055** -1.266** -1.609** -1.439** -1.332** -0.801 
 (5.21) (6.91) (5.83) (7.08) (7.06) (4.01) (6.98) (7.47) (5.23) (5.84) (3.43) (3.69) (2.80) (2.65) (1.54) 
GS 16 -3.579** -4.397** 16.368**-4.020** -4.483** -1.624* -4.038** -3.729** -2.874** -2.365** -2.817** -2.876** -3.029** -2.383** -2.738** 
 (3.40) (4.96) (16.62) (5.32) (6.67) (2.35) (5.99) (5.84) (4.14) (3.27) (3.88) (3.53) (3.27) (2.83) (2.81) 
 
Professional 1.766** 2.668** 3.404** 0.690* 1.736** 1.596** 1.800** 1.653** 1.728** 1.849** 0.617* 1.646** 2.097** 2.005** 0.886* 
 (4.47) (7.10) (8.27) (2.03) (5.86) (5.24) (6.31) (5.79) (6.13) (6.52) (2.14) (5.14) (5.67) (5.57) (2.47) 
Administrative 2.339** 2.912** 3.359** 1.187** 2.361** 2.862** 2.192** 1.769** 1.982** 2.413** 1.517** 2.148** 3.218** 1.969** 1.371** 
 (6.28) (8.22) (8.52) (3.66) (8.36) (9.83) (8.03) (6.46) (7.36) (8.95) (5.57) (7.18) (9.40) (5.89) (4.19) 
Technical -0.421 0.132 0.697 -1.289** 0.071 0.367 0.263 -0.218 0.178 0.474 -0.022 0.284 0.829** 0.502 -0.487 
 (1.21) (0.40) (1.90) (4.28) (0.27) (1.38) (1.06) (0.88) (0.73) (1.94) (0.09) (1.06) (2.67) (1.66) (1.63) 
Clerical -1.345** -1.046** -0.678 -2.427** -0.824** -0.390 -0.397 -0.495 -0.329 0.215 -0.451 -0.013 0.329 0.036 -0.637 
 (3.78) (3.09) (1.80) (7.83) (3.01) (1.37) (1.47) (1.85) (1.23) (0.80) (1.66) (0.04) (0.90) (0.10) (1.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
Table A.4 Continued 
 
Air Force -1.039** -0.974** -1.129** -1.148** -1.189** -0.670** -0.596* -0.806** -0.906** -0.319 -0.636** -0.783** -0.729* -0.832** -0.261 
 (3.39) (3.16) (3.34) (4.05) (4.77) (2.61) (2.51) (3.40) (5.09) (1.74) (3.24) (2.66) (2.21) (2.62) (0.72) 
Agriculture -1.152** -0.717* -0.853* -0.523 -0.325 -0.179 -0.362 -0.180 -0.144 0.430* 0.136 -0.273 -1.072** -0.777* -0.954** 
 (3.51) (2.19) (2.37) (1.76) (1.26) (0.68) (1.48) (0.74) (0.78) (2.24) (0.67) (0.89) (2.97) (2.17) (2.59) 
Army -1.536** -0.673* 0.122 -0.910** -1.180** -0.724** -0.747** -0.740** -0.707** -0.469** -0.368* -0.704* -0.700* -0.765* -0.310 
 (5.23) (2.26) (0.37) (3.35) (4.99) (2.99) (3.35) (3.30) (4.37) (2.77) (1.99) (2.50) (2.22) (2.53) (0.98) 
Commerce 0.054 -0.512 -0.496 0.245 0.451 1.274** 1.020** 1.078** 0.715* 0.657* 0.901* 0.701 0.230 4.429** -1.444** 
 (0.12) (1.17) (1.02) (0.62) (1.29) (3.58) (3.11) (3.36) (2.57) (2.33) (2.51) (1.66) (0.44) (8.76) (2.73) 
Defense -0.618 -1.037** 0.055 -0.242 -0.552* 0.092 -0.144 -0.290 -0.338 -0.182 -0.207 -0.445 -0.922* -0.909* -0.447 
 (1.69) (2.98) (0.14) (0.80) (2.10) (0.35) (0.59) (1.20) (1.82) (0.95) (1.03) (1.34) (2.45) (2.50) (1.18) 
Justice 0.217 0.683 0.876* 2.385** 0.745** -0.419 0.146 -0.170 -0.236 0.131 -0.007 0.313 -0.885** -0.826* 0.032 
 (0.53) (1.73) (2.08) (7.06) (2.58) (1.45) (0.56) (0.65) (1.14) (0.63) (0.03) (1.03) (2.62) (2.42) (0.09) 
Labor -0.367 -0.309 0.412 -0.190 -0.596 -0.198 -0.164 0.532 0.392 0.438 0.040 0.841 0.131 0.041 -0.000 
 (0.73) (0.62) (0.77) (0.42) (1.45) (0.47) (0.42) (1.36) (1.16) (1.17) (0.10) (1.50) (0.17) (0.06) (0.00) 
Energy -0.355 -0.712 -0.134 -0.383 0.254 -0.196 0.772* 0.889* 0.037 0.405 0.687 1.282* -2.296** 1.775* -0.514 
 (0.70) (1.43) (0.24) (0.85) (0.65) (0.51) (2.17) (2.48) (0.11) (1.23) (1.93) (2.24) (3.48) (2.30) (0.40) 
Education -0.933 0.888 -0.734 -0.266 0.534 0.517 0.418 0.879 2.115** 1.158* 0.124 N/A -1.803 -0.034 N/A 
 (1.20) (1.16) (0.89) (0.40) (0.94) (0.89) (0.73) (1.60) (4.00) (2.20) (0.11)  (0.83) (0.01)  
EPA 0.239 0.270 1.011 1.036 0.712 0.389 -0.027 -1.254** 0.935** 1.671** 0.742* 0.678 -1.839 0.978 -0.695 
 (0.38) (0.46) (1.56) (1.86) (1.46) (0.78) (0.06) (3.30) (2.75) (4.92) (2.18) (1.52) (1.42) (0.83) (0.29) 
GSA -0.760 -0.223 0.884 -0.359 0.117 -0.018 0.438 0.745 0.939** 1.130** 0.279 -0.450 N/A 4.313 0.458 
 (1.42) (0.42) (1.53) (0.75) (0.29) (0.04) (1.08) (1.89) (2.60) (2.99) (0.57) (0.56)  (1.05) (0.36) 
HHS -1.384** -1.429** -0.246 -0.461 -0.383 1.647** -0.195 -0.018 0.016 -0.010 0.548 -0.332 -0.732 -0.425 12.080** 
 (4.26) (4.37) (0.69) (1.56) (1.50) (6.34) (0.83) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (1.95) (0.88) (1.78) (1.11) (3.08) 
HUD -0.652 0.320 0.375 0.019 -0.465 0.386 0.287 1.361** 0.579 0.072 0.759* 0.407 1.015 -0.831 -0.115 
 (0.77) (0.65) (0.69) (0.04) (1.15) (0.93) (0.72) (3.45) (1.64) (0.19) (1.97) (0.88) (1.92) (1.62) (0.21) 
Interior -0.977** -1.273** -1.383** -0.339 -0.408 0.164 0.199 0.039 0.114 0.293 -0.017 0.352 0.666 -0.842 -0.403 
 (2.59) (3.36) (3.37) (0.99) (1.36) (0.54) (0.69) (0.14) (0.49) (1.20) (0.06) (0.77) (0.90) (1.00) (0.48) 
NASA 0.253 -0.618 -0.859 -0.647 -0.764* 0.008 0.139 -0.150 0.105 -0.031 0.469 -0.957 -0.184 -1.493 -2.037 
 (0.54) (1.34) (1.76) (1.58) (2.09) (0.02) (0.39) (0.42) (0.33) (0.09) (0.77) (0.97) (0.16) (0.88) (0.72) 
Navy -0.656* -0.668* 0.303 -0.799** -0.822** -0.980** -0.881** -1.004** -0.769** -0.370* -0.376* -0.615* -0.490 -0.839* -0.604 
 (2.12) (2.17) (0.91) (2.92) (3.44) (4.01) (3.91) (4.44) (4.66) (2.15) (2.00) (2.15) (1.48) (2.52) (1.73) 
State 0.593 0.855 -0.702 0.645 -0.789 0.939 -0.131 -0.189 -0.352 0.372 0.699 1.009 N/A -1.240 -1.297 
 (0.72) (1.08) (0.82) (0.92) (1.31) (1.48) (0.22) (0.32) (0.63) (0.64) (1.21) (1.19)  (0.52) (0.32) 
Transportation -0.122 0.854* 0.992** 1.016** 0.499 0.341 0.562* 0.667** -0.111 0.632 0.179 0.232 -1.121 -1.462* -0.514 
 (0.35) (2.43) (2.59) (3.24) (1.83) (1.23) (2.18) (2.61) (0.30) (1.71) (0.46) (0.38) (1.55) (2.16) (0.83) 
Treasury 0.258 -0.383 0.755* 0.001 -0.647** -0.819** -0.283 -0.151 -0.170 -0.153 0.751** -0.064 -0.162 0.760* 0.281 
 (0.82) (1.22) (2.20) (0.00) (2.65) (3.32) (1.25) (0.66) (1.03) (0.90) (4.03) (0.22) (0.51) (2.47) (0.88) 
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Table A.4 Continued 
 
Veterans Affairs -1.659** -1.510** -0.902** -1.480** -1.213** -1.342** -1.038** -1.084** -1.115** -0.570** -0.453* -0.733* -0.879* -1.493** -0.982* 
 (5.24) (4.72) (2.58) (5.12) (4.83) (5.28) (4.43) (4.63) (6.44) (3.19) (2.44) (2.07) (1.97) (3.14) (1.97) 
 
Constant 18.578** 16.978** 19.137** 19.381** 15.528** 11.796** 15.593** 13.150** 15.348** 14.702** 14.316** 18.707** 16.099** 17.333** 21.336** 
 (17.84) (16.71) (17.33) (21.19) (19.20) (13.88) (19.35) (16.42) (18.77) (17.14) (15.49) (16.30) (11.82) (12.86) (15.39) 
 
Observations 10,197 10,719 11,038 11,194 11,519 11,559 11,321 11,071 10,282 9,958 8,906 6,563 5,959 5,591 4,732 
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.23 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses                
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table A.5: Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion Probability by Year: Logit Model 
 
 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  
 
Outstanding 0.203** 0.468** 0.516** 0.493** 0.441** 0.076 0.566** 0.638** 0.627** 0.474**  
 (2.63) (6.20) (6.79) (6.38) (5.27) (0.88) (6.36) (7.06) (6.47) (4.93)  
Exceeds fully 0.052 0.238** 0.280** 0.237** 0.179* 0.006 0.184* 0.273** 0.209* 0.220*  
 (0.80) (3.66) (4.28) (3.48) (2.42) (0.07) (2.22) (3.14) (2.21) (2.36)  
Less than fully -0.622 -1.172 -0.062 -0.546 -0.420 -1.591* -0.943 -0.911 -0.173 -0.833  
 (1.50) (1.91) (0.13) (1.35) (0.73) (2.00) (1.20) (1.21) (0.30) (1.12)  
 
Observations 10261 10783 11085 11260 11608 11632 11413 11175 10352 10024 
 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
Outstanding 0.401** 0.455** 0.172 0.182 0.008 
 (4.14) (3.61) (1.42) (1.38) (0.06) 
Exceeds fully  0.138 0.048 -0.050 -0.073 -0.435** 
 (1.43) (0.38) (0.41) (0.55) (2.85) 
Less than fully -0.107 0.276 0.400 0.036 0.237 
 (0.19) (0.40) (0.58) (0.05) (0.36) 
 
Observations 8977 6612 5994 5619 4627 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and organizational characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table A.6: Career Advancement by PATCO Category  
 
 
 
 Mean 
Performance 
Rating 
% 
Outstanding 
Mean 
%  Change 
in Salary 
% 
Promoted 
Sample  
Size 
Professional 4.0 31.7 6.7 12.7 33,609 
Administrative 4.1 36.4 7.1 14.3 49,175 
Technical 3.9 29.8 6.3 14.9 34,342 
Clerical 4.0   34.8 6.5 17.8 21,595 
Other 3.9   24.3 6.9 16.8 4,127 
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Table A.7: T-test by PACTO Category: Career Advancement Comparison  
between Fully Successful and Outstanding 
 
 
 Mean % salary change %  promoted 
 Fully 
successful Outstanding 
Fully 
successful Outstanding 
Professional 7.1** 6.5 15.3** 13.7 
Administrative 7.6** 7.0 17.4** 15.2 
Technical 6.5** 6.2 15.4 15.7 
Clerical 6.8** 6.2 18.3 17.8 
Other 7.2** 6.6 18.6 17.1 
 
* significant at .05; ** significant at .01 
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Table A.8: Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth  
by PATCO Category: Panel Model 
 
 
 Prof. Admin. Tech. Cler. Other 
 
Outstanding 0.048 0.135 0.211** 0.143 -0.081 
 (0.64) (1.93) (2.89) (1.53) (0.38) 
Exceeds fully -0.051 -0.019 0.069 0.046 0.035 
 (0.80) (0.749) (1.16) (0.58) (0.20) 
Less than fully 0.540 -0.484 0.016 -0.178 -2.307 
 (1.36) (1.24) (0.04) (0.54) (1.36) 
 
Observations 33295 48631 33463 21141 4071 
R-squared 0.31 0.27 0.16 0.15 0.22 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and organizational characteristics    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table A.9: Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion Probability by PATCO 
Category: Panel Model 
 
 
 Prof. Admin. Tech. Cler. Other 
 
Outstanding 0.200* 0.375** 0.316** 0.396** 0.450* 
 (2.08) (5.96) (4.27) (4.63) (2.25) 
Exceeds fully 0.009 0.073 0.062 0.144* 0.076 
 (0.52) (1.34) (1.02) (1.98) (0.48) 
Less than fully 0.231 -0.102 -1.096 0.032 -6.319 
 (1.16) (0.26) (1.95) (0.09) (0.32) 
 
Observations 20048 31893 20333 13795 3100 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and organizational characteristics    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table A.10: Career Advancement by Grade Level 
 
 Mean 
Performance 
Rating 
% 
Outstanding 
Mean 
%  Change 
in Salary 
% 
Promoted 
Sample  
Size 
Grade 3a) 3.6 17.9 7.8 30.7 2,644 
Grade 4 3.8 26.0 6.8 20.6 13,842 
Grade 5 3.9   31.1 6.6 18.0 25,598 
Grade 6 4.0   34.9 6.5 19.0 17,189 
Grade 7 4.0  32.5 7.7 22.0 22,360 
Grade 8 4.1   34.3 6.1 14.5 7,070 
Grade 9 4.0   29.5 8.1 22.4 24,024 
Grade 10 3.9   25.8 6.3 16.6 3,414 
Grade 11 4.0   30.1 7.2 15.3 31,510 
Grade 12 4.1   33.9 6.3 9.0 36,802 
Grade 13 4.1   36.9 6.0 6.8 25,150 
Grade 14 4.2   41.7 5.8 5.7 12,398 
Grade 15 4.3   52.3 5.4 1.4 5,415 
Grade 16 4.4   55.0 5.5 N/A 740 
 
a) Grade 1, 2 and 3 are combined 
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Table A.11: T-test by Grade Level: Career Advancement Comparison 
between Fully Successful and Outstanding 
 
 
 Mean % salary change %  promoted 
 Fully 
successful Outstanding 
Fully 
successful Outstanding 
Grade 3a) 8.3* 7.3 31.9 33.3 
Grade 4 6.9** 6.5 19.7 21.8* 
Grade 5 6.8** 6.4 17.1 19.0** 
Grade 6 6.7** 6.4 19.9** 17.9 
Grade 7 8.7** 7.0 27.0** 20.4 
Grade 8 6.2 6.1 13.6 15.5 
Grade 9 8.6** 7.6 25.0** 22.3 
Grade 10 6.5 6.2 17.4 15.7 
Grade 11 7.2 7.2 15.3 17.8** 
Grade 12 6.2 6.5**   8.8 12.3** 
Grade 13 5.9 6.2**   6.1   8.9** 
Grade 14 5.6 6.1**   3.7   8.2** 
Grade 15 5.2 5.5*   0.1   2.3** 
Grade 16 5.0 5.6  N/A N/A 
 
a) Grade 1, 2 and 3 are combined 
* significant at .05; ** significant at .01 
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Table A.12: Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth by Grade: Panel Model 
 
 
 GS 1-3 GS 4 GS 5 GS 6 GS 7 GS 8 GS 9 GS 10 GS 11 GS 12 
 
Outstanding 1.367** 0.252 0.335** 0.153 0.171 0.199 0.311* 0.036 0.269** 0.186* 
 (2.71) (1.50) (2.99) (1.10) (1.24) (0.84) (2.29) (0.11) (2.59) (2.31)  
Exceeds fully 0.292 0.215 0.379** 0.188 0.159 -0.001 0.260* -0.191 0.179* 0.073 
 (0.84) (1.56) (4.08) (1.61) (1.40) (0.01) (2.34) (0.81) (2.20) (1.09)  
Less than fully 0.239 -0.633 -0.325 0.345 -0.089 3.065 0.516 -1.926 0.061 -0.409 
 (0.27) (1.14) (0.66) (0.58) (0.15) (1.62) (0.81) (1.10) (0.13) (0.99)  
 
Observations 1383 7575 14248 10014 13470 4315 14565 2330 19825 23997 
R-squared 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.10 
 
 GS 13 GS 14 GS 15 GS 16 
 
Outstanding .020 0.127 0.251 0.037 
 (0.23) (1.10) (1.28) (0.07) 
Exceeds fully -0.013 0.152 0.222 -0.170 
 (0.19) (1.47) (1.20) (0.35) 
Less than fully -0.133 0.367 3.098 N/A 
 (0.23) (0.57) (1.74)  
 
Observations 16410 8327 3645 505 
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.92 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and organizational characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table A.13: Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion Probability by Grade: Panel Model 
 
 
 GS 1-3 GS 4 GS 5 GS 6 GS 7 GS 8 GS 9 GS 10 GS 11 GS 12 
 
Outstanding 0.637 0.429* 0.472** -0.082 0.165 0.559 0.400* 0.243 0.398* 0.395* 
 (1.11) (2.13) (2.82) (0.34) (0.83) (1.37) (2.22) (0.27) (2.34) (2.43)  
Exceeds fully -0.263 0.193 0.377** 0.108 0.059 0.229 0.271 -0.786 0.189 0.190  
 (0.64) (1.19) (2.73) (0.54) (0.37) (0.70) (1.79) (1.24) (1.33) (1.28)  
Less than fully 2.400 -0.327 0.511 0.155 -0.130 3.428 -0.211 -1.410 0.463 -0.625  
 (1.62) (0.33) (0.52) (0.15) (0.11) (0.83) (0.24) (0.73) (0.50) (0.53) 
  
Observations 600 3583 5909 3823 5408 1551 5883 1252 7387 7340 
 
 GS 13 GS 14 
 
Outstanding 0.217 0.602 
  (0.93) (1.70) 
Exceeds fully 0.086 0.514  
  (0.40) (1.47) 
Less than fully -0.078 -3.314  
 (0.05) (0.20) 
  
Observations 3971 1955  
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and organizational characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A.14: Career Advancement by Agency 
 
 
 Mean 
Performance 
Rating 
% 
Outstanding 
Mean 
%  Change 
in Salary 
% 
Promoted 
Sample  
Size 
Army 4.5 60.6 6.5 13.5 35,041 
State 4.4 54.0 7.2 18.7 857 
Justice 4.2 38.3 7.8 20.5 11,952 
HUD 4.2 40.9 7.3 17.1 2,419 
Air Force 4.1 41.3 6.5 13.8 21,197 
Defense 4.1 34.6 6.7 14.4 13,050 
EPA 4.1 33.8 7.5 19.9 2,233 
GSA 4.1 31.7 7.5 20.7 1,951 
NASA 4.1 30.7 6.6 17.3 2,912 
Navy 4.1 35.3 6.4 14.3 28,157 
Other Agency 4.1 34.7 7.0 17.1 7,554 
Commerce 4.0 37.7 7.7 22.3 4,119 
Energy 4.0 31.5 6.7 15.9 2,750 
Education 4.0 37.8 7.0 18.8 891 
HHS  3.9 26.7 6.8 18.7 12,646 
Labor 3.8 18.1 7.1 16.6 2,500 
Treasury 3.8 19.2 7.2 18.5 22,669 
Agriculture 3.7 10.6 6.7 15.2 15,434 
Interior 3.7 15.2 6.5 15.3 7,145 
Transportation 3.7 18.1 7.5 19.8 7,422 
Vet. Affairs 3.7 21.1 6.0 11.9 21,875 
SSA 3.4 11.2 5.6 14.4 3,363 
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 Table A.15: T-test by Agency: Career Advancement Comparison  
between Fully Successful and Outstanding 
 
 
 Mean % salary change %  promoted 
 Fully 
successful 
Outstanding Fully 
successful 
Outstanding 
Air Force 7.0** 6.2 14.0 13.0 
Agriculture 7.0 6.8 15.3 16.5 
Army 7.5** 6.3 16.5** 12.1 
Commerce 7.6 7.8 19.6 19.3 
Defense 7.0 6.7 13.8 14.9 
Justice 8.9** 7.5 26.6** 17.4 
Labor 7.2 7.4 13.2 18.3 
Energy 6.3 6.9* 14.0 17.2 
Education 6.3 7.4 11.0 20.7* 
EPA 8.2 7.4 24.3* 17.0 
GSA 7.6 7.3 20.1 20.7 
HHS 6.9 6.6 17.5 17.7 
HUD 7.3 7.2 18.2 16.8 
Interior 6.4 6.8* 12.9 17.2** 
NASA 7.1 6.5 18.5 15.0 
Navy 6.7** 6.3 13.3 13.4 
State 7.6 7.0 19.0 15.0 
SSA 5.8 5.5 10.5 17.1** 
Transportation 8.3** 6.7 20.5** 16.1 
Treasury 7.8** 7.1 19.0 19.7 
Vet. Affairs 6.0 6.2 10.4 13.2** 
Other Agency 7.1 7.2 15.8 17.0 
 
* significant at .05; ** significant at .01
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Table A.16: Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth by Agency: Panel Model 
 
 
 Commerce Other Labor GSA Navy Energy Vet. Aff. Treasury 
         
Outstanding 0.747* 0.571* 0.621 0.596 0.176 0.158 0.155 0.153 
 (2.35) (2.55) (1.47) (1.08) (1.62) (0.42) (1.42) (1.13) 
Exceeds fully 0.635* 0.461* 0.047 0.726 -0.017 0.242 0.083 -0.004 
 (2.33) (2.39) (0.17) (1.52) (0.18) (0.79) (0.91) (0.04) 
Less than fully 0.519 -0.289 0.701 1.283 -0.235 -4.068* 0.964 0.023 
 (0.47) (0.41) (0.41) (0.44) (0.42) (2.05) (1.45) (0.06) 
         
Observations 2545 4527 1510 1239 18028 1697 12131 14618 
R-squared 0.30 0.22 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.26 
 
 
 Army NASA Agricult. Interior Transport. HUD HHS Education 
         
Outstanding 0.056 0.02 -0.002 -0.05 -0.058 -0.085 -0.119 -0.162 
 (0.50) (0.05) (0.01) (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.72) (0.22) 
Exceeds fully -0.035 -0.146 -0.005 0.002 -0.354 0.023 0.169 -0.31 
 (0.32) (0.41) (0.04) (0.01) (1.92) (0.07) (1.26) (0.50) 
Less than fully 0.15 0.037 -0.843 -0.631 -0.828 1.137 -0.719 -3.178 
 (0.25) (0.02) (1.19) (0.64) (0.61) (0.59) (0.87) (1.26) 
         
Observations 22313 1782 9751 3896 4791 1603 7883 511 
R-squared 0.19 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.31 0.32 0.22 0.28 
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Table A.16 Continued 
 
 
 Air Force Defense Justice EPA SSA State 
       
Outstanding -0.212 -0.247 -0.283 -0.464 -0.648 -0.954 
 (1.74) (1.49) (1.20) (0.94) (1.52) (1.38) 
Exceeds fully -0.329** -0.272* -0.262 -0.100 -0.751* -0.901 
 (3.18) (1.96) (1.27) (0.24) (2.12) (1.50) 
Less than fully 0.649 0.406 -0.404 3.189 8.966* -1.966 
 (0.54) (0.60) (0.32) (0.79) (2.54) (0.77) 
       
Observations 13385 7982 7059 1238 1621 499 
R-squared 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.22 0.43 
  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and organizational characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table A.17: Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion Probability by Agency: Panel Model 
 
 Other Treasury Air Force Vet. Aff. Agriculture Army HHS Labor 
         
Outstanding 0.417* 0.381** 0.380** 0.364** 0.293* 0.277** 0.275* 0.673 
 (2.08) (3.71) (3.13) (3.33) (2.02) (2.82) (2.04) (1.59) 
Exceeds fully 0.400* 0.079 0.132 0.214* 0.070 -0.017 0.163 0.609* 
 (2.29) (1.04) (1.24) (2.25) (0.73) (0.18) (1.51) (2.02) 
Less than fully 0.188 0.023 -0.374 0.284 -0.730 -1.473 -0.893 N/A 
 (0.30) (0.06) (0.26) (0.40) (0.69) (1.58) (0.80)  
         
Observations 2948 11295 8578 7058 6933 14894 5689 1014 
 
 
 Commerce GSA Transport. Energy Justice NASA Defense SSA 
         
Outstanding 0.359 0.354 0.247 0.218 0.165 0.154 0.152 0.150 
 (1.40) (0.92) (1.39) (0.69) (1.04) (0.43) (1.03) (0.21) 
Exceeds fully 0.348 0.058 0.083 -0.137 -0.098 0.049 -0.122 -0.499 
 (1.55) (0.17) (0.64) (0.50) (0.73) (0.16) (0.94) (0.94) 
Less than fully 1.808* N/A -4.131 -2.755 -0.627 N/A 0.420 N/A 
 (2.54)  (0.70) (0.20) (0.56)  (0.70)  
         
Observations 1705 938 3131 1131 5515 1169 4666 397 
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Table A.17 Continued 
 
 
 Navy HUD Interior Education State EPA 
       
Outstanding 0.144 0.142 0.065 0.040 -0.448 -0.477 
 (1.27) (0.46) (0.29) (0.06) (0.60) (1.14) 
Exceeds fully -0.180 -0.147 0.092 -0.303 -0.058 -0.289 
 (1.74) (0.54) (0.55) (0.47) (0.09) (0.83) 
Less than fully -1.038 -0.017 -0.643 -4.403 -4.216 N/A 
 (0.87) (0.01) (0.53) (0.42) (0.32)  
       
Observations 11406 1192 2472 363 374 870 
  
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and organizational characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%        
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Table A.18: Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings  
by PATCO Category: Ordered Logit Model 
 
           
 Professional Administrative Technical  Clerical  Other 
 
White females 0.363** 0.339** 0.312** 0.366** -0.051 
 (11.82) (14.72) (10.10) (6.92) (0.25) 
 
Black females -0.229** 0.008 0.106** -0.022 -0.381 
 (4.12) (0.23) (2.86) (0.38) (1.46) 
 
Hispanic females  0.093 -0.003 0.357** 0.137 -0.388 
 (0.80) (0.05) (5.50) (1.62) (1.19) 
 
Asian females  -0.065 0.391** 0.470** 0.345** 1.634 
 (0.75) (4.62) (4.78) (3.80) (1.41) 
 
 
Black males  -0.434** -0.278** -0.122* -0.177* -0.114 
 (7.81) (7.47) (2.51) (2.22) (1.23) 
 
Hispanic males -0.004 -0.024 -0.268** -0.132 -0.323** 
 (0.05) (0.43) (3.99) (0.85) (2.86) 
 
Asian males  -0.022 0.312** 0.054 -0.080 0.274 
 (0.39) (3.88) (0.54) (0.37) (1.14) 
 
Observations 33,295 48,631 33,463 21,141 4,071 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses      
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table A.19: Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings 
by Agency : Ordered Logit Model 
 
 
 Air Force Agriculture Army Commerce Defense Justice SSA Labor 
   
White females  0.494** 0.481** 0.673** 0.351** 0.460** 0.624** 0.086 1.088** 
 (10.98) (9.12) (17.54) (3.17) (8.10) (8.86) (0.53) (7.70)  
 
Black females 0.151 0.170 0.330** 1.069** 0.105 0.073 0.061 0.210 
 (1.85) (1.87) (5.78) (7.68) (1.44) (0.79) (0.32) (1.25)  
 
Hispanic females 0.436** 0.493* 0.390** -0.387 0.270 0.360** 0.060 1.282** 
 (4.29) (2.47) (3.37) (1.33) (1.39) (2.75) (0.21) (3.22)  
 
Asian females 0.649** 0.460 0.664** -0.204 0.537** -0.033 -0.302 1.481* 
 (4.92) (1.85) (4.99) (0.52) (2.82) (0.16) (0.49) (2.47)  
 
 
Black males -0.323** -0.404** -0.119 0.111 -0.204* -0.121 -0.777** -0.340 
 (3.60) (3.65) (1.92) (0.65) (2.24) (1.36) (2.59) (1.37) 
 
Hispanic males  0.217* 0.133 -0.227* -1.137** 0.111 -0.304** -0.942* -1.623 
 (2.31) (1.04) (2.22) (2.72) (0.57) (3.30) (2.18) (1.88)  
 
Asian males 0.144 0.266 -0.603** -0.204 0.055 0.748** -31.112 3.622** 
 (0.98) (1.33) (5.21) (0.94) (0.31) (3.27) (0.00) (4.25)  
 
Observations 13,385 9,751 22,313 2,545 7,982 7,059 1,621 1,510  
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Table A.19 Continued 
 
 
 Energy Education EPA GSA HHS HUD Interior NASA 
 
White females  0.305* 0.333 0.337* 0.660** 0.311** 0.164 0.866** 0.222 
 (2.07) (1.11) (2.09) (4.44) (5.16) (1.15) (8.99) (1.50)  
 
Black females 0.226 0.073 -0.164 0.301 -0.134 -0.383* -0.402* -1.322**  
 (1.17) (0.24) (0.84) (1.40) (1.87) (2.48) (2.27) (4.09) 
 
Hispanic females 1.010** 0.985 0.769 -0.246 -0.189 -1.057* 0.422 -0.753  
 (2.96) (0.61) (1.87) (0.43) (1.50) (2.14) (1.76) (1.87)  
 
Asian females 0.241 N/A 0.720 0.549 -0.093 1.628** -0.054 -0.369  
  (0.32)  (1.80) (1.31) (0.48) (3.83) (0.16) (0.67)  
 
 
Black males  -0.285 -0.493 -2.358** -0.307 -0.418** -0.619** 0.143 -1.202**  
 (1.18) (1.36) (5.61) (1.23) (4.28) (3.03) (0.52) (4.53)  
 
Hispanic males 0.130 -1.714 -2.126* 1.223* -0.328 -0.776* 0.097 -0.543*  
 (0.47) (1.86) (2.42) (2.25) (1.80) (2.30) (0.44) (2.18)  
 
Asian males 0.459 N/A -0.722 0.684* -0.550* 1.073* -0.153 0.362  
  (0.53)  (1.16) (1.98) (2.22) (2.47) (0.60) (0.83)  
 
Observations 1,697 511 1,238 1,239 7,883 1,603 3,896 1,782  
 
 
 
 
123 
Table A.19 Continued 
 
 
 Navy State Transport. Treasury Vet. Aff. Other Agency 
 
White females  0.514** 0.175 0.438** 0.387** 0.324** 0.768** 
 (12.00) (0.59) (5.23) (8.96) (6.94) (9.59) 
 
Black females  -0.012 0.579 -0.158 -0.115* -0.043 0.515** 
  (0.18) (1.81) (1.24) (2.16) (0.76) (5.42) 
 
Hispanic females -0.138 N/A 0.217 0.115 0.577** 0.082 
 (0.87)  (0.77) (1.20) (4.56) (0.43) 
 
Asian females 0.347** -0.438 1.521** 0.450** -0.256 0.781** 
 (3.91) (0.57) (4.00) (3.00) (1.34) (3.00) 
 
 
Black males  0.022 -0.068 -0.782** -0.322** -0.088 -0.499** 
 (0.31) (0.12) (5.19) (3.97) (1.31) (4.01) 
 
Hispanic males  -0.388** N/A -0.254 0.009 -0.051 0.566** 
  (3.47)  (1.40) (0.08) (0.41) (2.72) 
 
Asian males  -0.092 0.242 0.350 0.192 0.109 1.409** 
  (1.25) (0.32) (1.66) (1.30) (0.58) (5.13) 
 
Observations 18,028 499 4,791 14,618 12,131 4,527 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses         
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table A.20: Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings  
by Grade Level: Ordered Logit Model 
 
         
 GS 1-3 GS 4 GS 5 GS 6 GS 7 GS 8 GS 9 GS 10 
 
White females  0.151 0.339** 0.496** 0.400** 0.630** 0.383** 0.424** 0.346**  
 (0.93) (4.78) (9.34) (6.12) (13.46) (4.61) (10.76) (3.03)  
 
Black females -0.052 0.069 0.173** 0.178* 0.233** 0.162 -0.006 0.333*  
 (0.30) (0.87) (2.95) (2.41) (4.13) (1.59) (0.10) (2.18)  
 
Hispanic females 0.255 0.214 0.190* 0.425** 0.756** 0.026 0.210 -0.014  
 (0.80) (1.68) (2.00) (3.46) (7.84) (0.15) (1.78) (0.06)  
 
Asian females -0.148 0.173 0.470** 0.798** 0.885** 0.639 0.313* 0.162  
 (0.49) (1.21) (4.27) (5.22) (6.62) (1.74) (2.44) (0.40)  
 
 
Black males -0.092 -0.146 0.143 -0.180 -0.235** -0.255 -0.259** 0.743**  
 (0.38) (1.45) (1.85) (1.96) (2.78) (1.92) (3.80) (2.76)  
 
Hispanic males 0.224 -0.275 -0.076 -0.057 -0.464** -0.818** -0.253** -0.161  
 (0.68) (1.27) (0.56) (0.38) (3.77) (3.69) (3.02) (0.67)  
 
Asian males  N/A -0.124 -0.238 0.458 0.227 -0.667 0.017 3.373**  
  (0.48) (1.35) (1.89) (1.34) (1.95) (0.13) (2.79)  
 
Observations 1,383 7,575 14,248 10,014 13,470 4,315 14,565 2,330 
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Table A.20 Continued 
 
 
 GS 11 GS 12 GS 13 GS 14 GS 15 GS 16 
 
White females 0.373** 0.433** 0.310** 0.578** 0.558** 1.137** 
 (10.98) (13.11) (7.40) (8.76) (5.14) (3.09) 
 
Black females 0.219** -0.031 -0.241** -0.036 1.123** -1.251 
 (3.95) (0.60) (3.46) (0.29) (3.94) (1.72) 
 
Hispanic females -0.165 0.354** 0.165 0.328 -1.941 N/A 
 (1.65) (2.92) (0.93) (1.02) (1.89)  
 
Asian females  -0.097 0.311* 0.760** -0.085 -0.662 N/A 
  (0.85) (2.50) (4.30) (0.38) (1.13)  
 
 
Black males  -0.377** -0.278** -0.184** -0.214* -0.260 0.498 
  (6.28) (4.79) (2.64) (2.11) (1.39) (1.15) 
 
Hispanic males 0.178* -0.115 -0.203 0.226 -0.365 -5.778** 
 (2.25) (1.53) (1.88) (1.40) (1.15) (4.90) 
 
Asian males  0.071 0.063 0.021 0.200 -0.714** -1.933 
  (0.80) (0.81) (0.19) (1.42) (2.96) (1.81) 
 
Observations 19,825 23,997 16,410 8,327 3,645 505 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses         
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table A.21: Race and gender Differences in Performance Appraisal Ratings by Sex-type of Occupation: Ordered Logit Model 
 
          
 % male: <11  11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50  
 
White females 0.190 0.440** 0.524** 0.259** 0.364**  
 (1.57) (7.09) (11.36) (6.73) (9.34)  
 
Black females -0.289* 0.138* 0.248** 0.073 -0.049  
 (2.32) (2.03) (4.54) (1.53) (0.97)  
 
Hispanic females -0.001 0.192 0.461** 0.014 0.211  
 (0.01) (1.89) (5.16) (0.15) (1.84)  
 
Asian females 0.100 0.407** 0.694** 0.120 0.715**  
 (0.66) (3.13) (6.24) (0.99) (4.57)  
 
  
Black males -0.203 0.103 -0.219** -0.157** -0.338**  
 (1.00) (0.84) (2.73) (2.63) (5.20)  
 
Hispanic males -0.658 -0.068 -0.173 -0.095 -0.107  
 (1.23) (0.30) (1.04) (0.83) (0.90)  
 
Asian males 0.374 -0.708 0.068 -0.402** 0.069  
 (0.57) (1.89) (0.36) (2.60) (0.40)  
 
Observations 12,486 10,283 15,567 17,819 15,678 
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Table A.21 Continued 
 
 
 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 91 or above 
 
White females  0.341** 0.360** 0.420** 0.011 0.182* 
  (6.56) (9.10) (8.64) (0.21) (2.37) 
 
Black females -0.149* -0.218** -0.161 -0.501** -0.166 
 (2.07) (3.08) (1.80) (3.79) (0.78) 
 
Hispanic females 0.154 0.181 0.483* -0.092 -0.716 
 (0.95) (1.49) (2.50) (0.51) (1.64) 
 
Asian females 0.005 0.486** 0.166 -0.209 -0.322 
  (0.03) (2.66) (1.27) (0.96) (1.34) 
 
 
Black males -0.501** -0.198** -0.006 -0.359** -0.133* 
 (5.71) (2.82) (0.06) (5.76) (2.06) 
 
Hispanic males -0.003 -0.016 0.045 -0.177* -0.213** 
 (0.02) (0.14) (0.46) (2.33) (2.99) 
 
Asian males 0.105 0.463** 0.075 0.286** -0.001 
 (0.71) (3.65) (0.64) (2.83) (0.02) 
 
Observations 8,795 14,630 12,559 15,666 17,126 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses         
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics          
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A.22: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth  
in the Upper and Lower Grade Levels 
 
 
Upper Level (Grade 14 or Above) 
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males males males 
 
Outstanding 0.401** 0.366 0.327 -5.413 0.287 0.400** -0.324 -0.435 
 (4.35) (1.40) (0.59) (1.32) (0.27) (4.59) (0.38) (0.64) 
 
Exceeds fully  0.162 0.069 -0.001 -1.753 0.463 0.162 0.029 0.221 
successful (1.81) (0.25) (0.00) (0.48) (0.42) (1.91) (0.04) (0.38) 
 
 
Lower Level (Grade 5 or Below) 
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males males males 
 
Outstanding 0.611** 0.275** 0.551** 1.191** 0.484 0.054 0.564 -0.884 B 
 (3.11) (2.71) (3.62) (3.31) (1.12) (0.19) (0.91) (1.88) 
 
Exceeds fully  -0.037 0.096 0.503** A 0.914** A 0.617 -0.002 0.540 -0.713 
successful (0.21) (0.99) (3.70) (2.68) (1.53) (0.01) (1.09) (0.84) 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
A: Differences in coefficients between white male and other groups are statistically significant at .01 level, B: significant at .05 level 
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Table A.23: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Percent Change in Salary Growth 
in the Male-Dominant and Female-Dominant Occupations 
 
Male-Dominant (71% or Above Male) 
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males males males 
 
Outstanding 0.191** 0.491* -0.244 1.634 0.645 0.533* 0.407 0.229 
 (3.02) (2.15) (0.49) (1.39) (0.88) (2.29) (1.29) (0.68) 
 
Exceeds fully  -0.056 -0.373 -0.060 1.021 1.054 0.426* 0.170 B -0.194 
successful (1.02) (1.85) (0.14) (1.00) (1.58) (2.11) (0.64) (0.68) 
 
 
Female-Dominant (30% or Below Male) 
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males males males 
 
Outstanding 0.446** 0.320** 0.495**  0.759**  0.732 0.241 0.241 1.248 
 (2.68) (4.33) (4.35) (2.72) (1.90) (0.74) (0.22) (1.16) 
 
Exceeds fully  0.035 0.083 0.264*  0.346 0.337 -0.355 -0.330 1.076 
successful (0.23) (1.14) (2.51) (1.27) (0.91) (1.25) (0.43) (1.07) 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
A: Differences in coefficients between white male and other groups are statistically significant at .01 level, B: significant at .05 level
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Table A.24: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion 
in the Upper and Lower Grade Levels 
 
 
Upper Level (Grade 14 or Above)  
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males  males males 
 
Outstanding 1.313** 0.661 1.508 N/A N/A 1.824* N/A -6.628 
 (5.90) (1.68) (1.19)   (2.52)  (0.15) 
 
Exceeds fully 0.788** 0.278 1.214 N/A N/A 0.499 N/A -3.495 
Successful (3.50) (0.67) (0.92)   (0.69)  (0.03) 
 N/A: Coefficients are not available because either all the observations have the same value (i.e., nobody is promoted) or the sample 
size is zero 
 
 
Lower Level (Grade 5 or Below)  
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males  males males 
 
Outstanding 0.526** 0.257** 0.510** 0.992** 0.411 0.094 1.209* -0.999 
 (4.05) (3.74) (5.04) (3.60) (1.11) (0.45) (2.31) (0.87) 
 
Exceeds fully 0.150 0.060 0.354** 0.892** B 0.458 0.078 0.213 -0.327 
Successful (1.31) (0.92) (4.00) (3.51) (1.37) (0.44) (0.50) (0.35) 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics        
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
A: Differences in coefficients between white male and other groups are statistically significant at .01 level, B: significant at .05 level 
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Table A.25: Difference in the Impact of Performance Ratings on Promotion  
in the Male-Dominant and Female-Dominant Occupations 
 
 
Male-Dominant (71% or Above Male)  
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males  males males 
 
Outstanding 0.420** 0.592** 0.093 0.719 0.986 0.451* 0.646** 0.361 
 (7.78) (4.71) (0.29) (0.75) (1.78) (2.41) (3.05) (1.29) 
 
Exceeds fully 0.148** 0.214** 0.096 -0.070 0.462 0.367* 0.289* 0.047 
Successful (3.16) (1.94) (0.37) (0.09) (0.89) (2.35) (1.67) (0.29) 
 
 
 
Female-Dominant (30% of Below Male)  
 White White Black Hispanic Asian Black Hispanic Asian 
 males females females females females males  males males 
 
Outstanding 0.419** 0.279** 0.429** 0.749**  0.520 0.308 0.461 0.888 
 (3.41) (5.34) (5.59) (3.89) (1.87) (1.32) (0.49) (0.87) 
 
Exceeds fully 0.129 0.073 0.256** 0.384* 0.086 0.166 0.017 -0.873 
Successful (1.13) (1.41) (3.65) (2.12) (0.33) (0.84) (0.03) (0.95) 
 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
Model includes individual and job-related characteristics         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
A: Differences in coefficients between white male and other groups are statistically significant at .01 level, B: significant at .05 level 
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